On 01/23/2012 07:09 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012 at 06:53:17PM +0100, Peter Krempa wrote:
The domain schema enforced restrictions on the domain name string that
the code doesn't. This patch relaxes the check, leaving the restrictions
on the driver or hypervisor.
---
And maybe we should consider adding some restrictions on the qemu driver, as the daemon
is competely fine with creating a domain with the name "../../../../../../../test" that
has its configuration stored in "/test.xml" then.
I don't think we should remove the pattern entirely. If we want a more
general pattern though, we could do an 'allow all', and blacklist
just '/' and perhaps a few other characters.
Well, slash is one of those symbols, that some hypervisors happily take
as a valid domain name without screwing up their config files. I think
we should blacklist only the newline and let the hypervisor decide what
they accept and what not.
Peter
I think we should also fix the drivers to check this, since once we
have stricter access control support in libvirt, the kind of issue
you describe with QEMU will be classed as a CVE security exploit.
Daniel
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