On 09/28/2011 11:52 AM, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
We do have a historical syntax from Xen paravirt which lets us call out
to a helper at boot time, namely the "<bootloader>" element. With Xen
this is typically something like pygrub, or pxegrub, which does some
work and writes out a kernel+initrd into temporary files, and prints
the file paths + any kernel args on stdout.
We could just wire up this concept in KVM too without any real trouble,
and then we could have guestfs-bootloader script todo the magic setup
I'm fine with this.
Are there security implications to allowing users to add<bootloader>
clauses pointing at random scripts that get run on remote machines as
different users?
No more so than the fact that we let random clients specify <disk>
devices to random devices on remote machines. Right now, granting
non-read-only connection rights to a user effectively gives them root
access to the machine. There's eventual plans to further restrict
things via per-command ACLs, and this should be considered during those
plans, but until then, I don't see it as any larger a hole than anything
else already present in libvirt design.
--
Eric Blake eblake@xxxxxxxxxx +1-801-349-2682
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
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