Am 21.07.2011 17:01, schrieb Stefan Hajnoczi: > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:02 PM, Eric Blake <eblake@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> Thank you for persisting - you've found another hole that needs to be >> plugged. It sounds like you are proposing that after a qemu process dies, >> that libvirt re-reads the qcow2 metadata headers, and validates that the >> backing file information has not changed in a manner unexpected by libvirt. >> If it has, then the qemu process that just died was compromised to the >> point that restarting a new qemu process from the old image is now a >> security risk. So this is _yet another_ security aspect that needs to be >> coded into libvirt as part of hardening sVirt. > > The backing file information changes when image streaming completes. > > Before: fedora.img <- my_vm.qed > After: my_vm.qed (fedora.img is no longer referenced) > > The image streaming operation copies data out of fedora.img and > populates my_vm.qed. When image streaming completes, the backing file > is no longer needed and my_vm.qed is updated to drop the backing file. > > I think we need to design carefully to prevent QEMU and libvirt making > incorrect assumptions about who does what. I really wish that all > this image file business was outside QEMU and libvirt - that we had a > separate storage management service which handled the details. QEMU > would only do block device operations (no image format manipulation), > and libvirt would only delegate to the storage management service. And how do you implement that in a way that works on all platforms, and without root privileges? I can't see this happen unless it stays completely optional. Kevin -- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list