On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 04:51:51PM -0600, Eric Blake wrote:
> I got bit in a debugging session on an uninstalled libvirtd; the
> code tried to call out to the installed $LIBEXECDIR/libvirt_iohelper
> instead of my just-built version. So I set a breakpoint and altered
> the binary name to be "./src/libvirt_iohelper", and it still failed
> because I don't have "." on my PATH.
>
> According to POSIX, execvp only searches PATH if the name does
> not contain a slash. Since we are trying to mimic that behavior,
> an anchored name should be relative to the current working dir.
>
> * src/util/util.c (virFindFileInPath): Anchored relative names do
> not invoke a PATH search.
> ---
> src/util/util.c | 8 ++++++++
> 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/util/util.c b/src/util/util.c
> index 1441c51..20ccfa7 100644
> --- a/src/util/util.c
> +++ b/src/util/util.c
> @@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ char *virFindFileInPath(const char *file)
> return NULL;
> }
>
> + /* If we are passed an anchored path (containing a /), then there
> + * is no path search - it must exist in the current directory
> + */
> + if (strchr(file, '/')) {
> + virFileAbsPath(file, &path);
> + return path;
> + }
> +
> /* copy PATH env so we can tweak it */
> path = getenv("PATH");
That sounds right. The only issue is that the slight change of semantic
may suddenly allow to run binaries outside of $PATH which may be a
security concern. But virFindFileInPath() shouldn't be the place to
implement such a security control, so ACK,
Daniel
--
Daniel Veillard | libxml Gnome XML XSLT toolkit http://xmlsoft.org/
daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxx | Rpmfind RPM search engine http://rpmfind.net/
http://veillard.com/ | virtualization library http://libvirt.org/
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