On 04/04/2011 08:16 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
That doesn't really have any impact. If a desktop user is logged
in, udev may change the ownership to match that user, but if they
aren't, then udev may reset it to root:disk. Either way, QEMU
may loose permissions to the disk.
Then if you create a guest without being in the 'disk' group, it'll
fail. That's pretty expected AFAICT.
But with libvirt today, when you launch a guest, your security context
doesn't matter and there's no way you can control what context the guest
gets. libvirt is essentially creating it's own authorization
mechanism. Supporting ACLs goes much further down that path.
How much of a leap would it be to spawn a guest with the credentials
of the user that created/defined it? Or better yet, to let the user
be specified in the XML.
That's a completely independent RFE which won't fix this issue in
the general case.
I think it really does.
Regards,
Anthony Liguori
Regards,
Daniel
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