On 06/16/2010 02:54 PM, Jamie Strandboge wrote:
Hi,
I noticed today that ebiptablesWriteToTempFile() creates a temporary
file in /tmp that is later executed. It uses mkstemp() and therefore is
safe from symlinks attacks, however, there is not really any reason that
I can see why it is using /tmp instead of somewhere
like /var/lib/libvirt. If libvirtd is confined under a MAC which allows
execution of /tmp/virtd* and a vulnerability is found in libvirtd,
the /tmp path leaves an opportunity for a local non-root attacker to
write a script in /tmp and then subvert libvirt to execute that script.
I don't mind the move of the temporary file, but I'd like to understand
how would someone subvert libvirt to run an arbitrary script?
Stefan
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