Re: [PATCH v3 00/27] [PATCH v3 00/27] native support for nftables in virtual network driver

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On 4/26/24 6:24 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 06:22:33PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 01:38:06AM -0400, Laine Stump wrote:
V2: https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/thread/5RTZ6PC3N3CO6X353QUHLVOL43SWQ4JD/

This patch series enables libvirt to use nftables rules rather than
iptables *when setting up virtual networks* (it does *not* add
nftables support to the nwfilter driver).

I deployed on my machine and restarted virtnetworkd, with nft backend
active. I have 2 networks running, and got the following result

table ip libvirt {
         chain INPUT {
                 type filter hook input priority filter; policy accept;
                 counter packets 363 bytes 30801 jump LIBVIRT_INP
         }

         chain FORWARD {
                 type filter hook forward priority filter; policy accept;
                 counter packets 1 bytes 76 jump LIBVIRT_FWX
                 counter packets 1 bytes 76 jump LIBVIRT_FWI
                 counter packets 1 bytes 76 jump LIBVIRT_FWO
         }

         chain OUTPUT {
                 type filter hook output priority filter; policy accept;
                 counter packets 286 bytes 107221 jump LIBVIRT_OUT
         }

         chain LIBVIRT_INP {
                 iifname "virbr0" udp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 iifname "virbr0" tcp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 iifname "virbr0" udp dport 67 counter packets 1 bytes 320 accept
                 iifname "virbr0" tcp dport 67 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 iifname "virbr1" udp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 iifname "virbr1" tcp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 iifname "virbr1" udp dport 67 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 iifname "virbr1" tcp dport 67 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
         }

         chain LIBVIRT_OUT {
                 oifname "virbr0" udp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 oifname "virbr0" tcp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 oifname "virbr0" udp dport 68 counter packets 1 bytes 336 accept
                 oifname "virbr0" tcp dport 68 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 oifname "virbr1" udp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 oifname "virbr1" tcp dport 53 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 oifname "virbr1" udp dport 68 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
                 oifname "virbr1" tcp dport 68 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
         }

I'm wondering if these DHCP and DNS rules are in fact pointless.

In iptables, there's 1 set of global tables, and other firewall
tools or sysadmin might have put a DENY/REJECT that catches
DHCP/DNS. We inserted libvirt rules at the head of the tables,
so we can then explicitly ACCEPT DHCP/DNS, even if later rules
would deny them. So the LIBVIRT_INP/LIBVIRT_OUT rules are useful
in the context of iptables.

In nftables, there are arbitrary many tables, and a packet needs
to be allowed by *all* the tables, to continue its flow.

If a non-libvirt tables has put in a DENY/REJECT that catches
DHCP/DNS, then no matter what rules we put in the 'libvirt'
tables, we can never undo that DENY/REJECT.

So these LIBVIRT_INP/LIBVIRT_OUT rules are entirely pointless
unless the 'libvirt' table had later rules that could be
DENY/REJECTing DHCP/DNS. We don't today.

The only way I see these DHCP/DNS rules being useful, is if
the LIBVIRT_INP chain had a default 'deny' rule for 'virbr0',
to block the guest from all access to the host. That would
to some extent overlap with a general host firewall tool,
but there might not be one.

Currently our "isolated" config still allows guests to access
the host, just won't route off host. I guess any of the forward
modes could conceptually have a "deny host" access rule.

Still, even if we implemented this "deny host" concept, we
still don't need to add these DHCP/DNS rules to LIBVIRT_INP
and LIBVIRT_OUT, unless 'deny host' is actually active.

IOW, I think we should delete (or comment out) all the DHCP/DNS
rules from your nftables impl currently.

This all makes sense. I'll try it out early next week along with the changes to table/chain naming you suggested yesterday. (I would say "this weekend", but it's springtime, which means "end of year" parties are happening everywhere, and we have 3 of them we have to go to just this weekend :-/)
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