On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 18:23:59 +0000, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 11:17:22AM -0600, Jonathon Jongsma wrote:
> > On 12/9/22 4:09 AM, Peter Krempa wrote:
> > >On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 16:59:00 -0500, Jonathon Jongsma wrote:
> > >>Add some helper functions to build a virCommand object and run the
> > >>nbdkit process for a given virStorageSource.
> > >>
> > >>Signed-off-by: Jonathon Jongsma <jjongsma@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >>---
> > >> src/qemu/qemu_nbdkit.c | 251 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >> src/qemu/qemu_nbdkit.h | 10 ++
> > >> 2 files changed, 261 insertions(+)
> > >>
> >
> > ...
> >
> >
> > >>+static int
> > >>+qemuNbdkitProcessBuildCommandSSH(qemuNbdkitProcess *proc,
> > >>+ virCommand *cmd)
> > >>+{
> > >>+ const char *user = NULL;
> > >>+ virStorageNetHostDef *host = &proc->source->hosts[0];
> > >>+ g_autofree char *portstr = g_strdup_printf("%u", host->port);
> > >>+
> > >>+ /* nbdkit plugin name */
> > >>+ virCommandAddArg(cmd, "ssh");
> > >>+
> > >>+ virCommandAddArgPair(cmd, "host", host->name);
> > >>+ virCommandAddArgPair(cmd, "port", portstr);
> > >>+ virCommandAddArgPair(cmd, "path", proc->source->path);
> > >>+
> > >>+ if (proc->source->auth)
> > >>+ user = proc->source->auth->username;
> > >>+ else if (proc->source->ssh_user)
> > >>+ user = proc->source->ssh_user;
> > >
> > >So there's a bit problem with this, which also explains my reluctance to
> > >simply supporting the SSH protocol in the current state without properly
> > >designing other required parameters for SSH authentication. And even
> > >then it will most likely break "historical compatibility".
> > >
> > >So historically we didn't implement ssh protocol at all. Users (notably
> > >libguestfs) worked this around by adding a wrapper QCOW2 image and
> > >setting up the backing store string such that qemu would access the ssh
> > >image.
> > >
> > >When blockdev support was added I needed a way to port the existing
> > >functionality specifically for libguestfs. This made me add the ssh
> > >protocol and forwart the minimum set of properties to the image (thus
> > >the 'ssh_user' field.
>
> Off topic, but I wanted to check what we do now. We generate this XML
> fragment:
>
> $ guestfish --format=raw -a ssh://foo/var/tmp/fedora-36.img -i -vx
>
> ...
>
> <disk device="disk" type="network">
> <source protocol="ssh" name="/var/tmp/fedora-36.img">
> <host name="foo"/>
> </source>
> <target dev="sda" bus="scsi"/>
> <driver name="qemu" type="raw" cache="writeback"/>
> <address type="drive" controller="0" bus="0" target="0" unit="0"/>
> </disk>
>
> which I think is correct(?)
Kind of ... it uses the un-documented way to instantiate SSH which is
undocumented due to the reasons I mentioned originally, but it should
work to the extent it used to in the past with qemu.
> > >But there's another thing that was always configured out-of-band (via
> > >environment variables) and that is the ssh agent socket path or ssh key
> > >path.
>
> Right - this doesn't work in fact:
>
> Original error from libvirt: internal error: process exited while connecting to monitor: 2022-12-09T18:16:45.674960Z qemu-kvm: -blockdev {"driver":"ssh","path":"/var/tmp/fedora-36.img","server":{"host":"foo","port":"22"},"node-name":"libvirt-2-storage","cache":{"direct":false,"no-flush":false},"auto-read-only":true,"discard":"unmap"}: failed to authenticate using publickey authentication and the identities held by your ssh-agent [code=1 int1=-1]
The error message you are getting here means that both agent and
privkey authentication failed.
> Am I doing something wrong here? I have to confess it's been a very
> long time since I tried to use the ssh support directly in libguestfs
> (see below for why). So I don't quite remember how it's supposed to
> work, or else it broke and I didn't notice.
In the configuration that guestfish/libguestfs uses it simply uses a SSH
disk and doesn't configure the 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK=' environment variable via
the 'qemu' namespace env pass options. libvirt will not pass it by
design so agent based authentication is out of the question.
Since the XML doesn't have any way to specify which auth to use the last
fallback option is to use the default ssh key/identity. Qemu also
doesn't have any option to unlock the ssh key so really the only option
is password-less keys.
If you have them configured it still works at least in my testing.
This obviously works only for 'session' mode connections, as in the
system/privileged mode qemu is spawned as a different user which doesn't
even have a home directory so there's no way to give it ssh keys.
This means that ssh-backed disks worked only:
1) in session mode, if you env-passed the agent, or used password-less
keys
2) in system mode, if you env-passed the agent (and hacked around
selinux somehow)
Based on the above, the only working option for now is session-mode with
password-less keys.
> > >These are not present in the virStorageSource because they are not even
> > >configured for the blockdev 'ssh' protocol driver directly.
> > >
> > >Now with switching to nbdkit this means agent/sshkey authentication will
> > >necessarily break for such usage as we simply don't have the
> > >information.
> > >
> > >So what to do about it?
> > >
> > >We can either break the old way completely, which I guess would be
> > >mostly okay since libguestfs most likely now uses nbdkit anyways, and
> > >then design it properly. Obviously since the qemu ssh blockdev backend
> > >driver still configures stuff using environment variables thus the new
> > >configuration will be available only when nbdkit is in use.
>
> So for libguestfs as above we're using libvirt (and hence indirectly
> qemu's ssh). That's broken, but no one reported the bug so I guess
> it's little used.
Or the users are using it with password-less keys as their only option.
> But you're right that for virt-v2v we switched to using
> nbdkit-ssh-plugin a while back and that really is used and tested
> extensively. (In this case we use libvirt + qemu's nbd driver to talk
> to the nbdkit endpoint.)
>
> > >Other possibility, if we want to keep old functionality working as it
> > >was, is to avoid the use of nbdkit.
> > >
> > >Either way the implementation of SSH as done in this series simply just
> > >breaks SSH usage completely, by not being able to support the old hacky
> > >way of using agent/sshkey, not implementing any new support and not even
> > >implementing password authentication.
> > >
> > >What now? I don't really care too deeply about the hacky impl we have
> > >now. If libguestfs is no longer using I reckon we can simply break it
> > >and not deal with the fallout.
> > >
> > >I'm not sure how others care about that though.
> > >
> > >Obviously another option (besides doing a proper desing on
> > >authentication config) is to not touch anything ssh-related for now.
> > >
> >
> > Adding Rich to cc in case he has anything to add to this discussion.
> >
> > The problem, as I understand it, is the desire to remove the qemu
> > block plugins from distributions. If that happens, then avoiding the
> > use of nbdkit within libvirt won't solve anything -- the ssh use
> > case will still break due to the absence of these qemu plugins.
> >
> > I'm afraid I don't have enough background information about when ssh
> > is used and how common it is to make these decisions on my own. But
> > I agree that the current implementation in this patch series is not
> > complete enough to be useful.
>
> From the libguestfs point of view, we are generating the
> <disk .. type="network"><source protocol="ssh"> fragment above
> and hoping that libvirt's implementation does the right thing.
Well it does in a very specific limited set of options which were
implemented as a hack to prevent breakage when we switched to blockdev
mode.
Now with these patches 'nbdkit' would most likely work the same way in
the exact scenario where session mode libvirt is used with password-less
keys.
What will break is if anybody used agent and passed it via the
environment because the nbdkit process will not get the environment
override which was specified for qemu. (And it should not get it either).
Obviously env pass is where we don't give strong non-breakage
guarantees.
Ideally we'll provide a better interface for setting authentication with
ssh which will allow you to pass specific keys, agent socket, or
password for password-based auth, but since libguestfs is
not actually passing the agent socket (any more?) and simply works only
with the default identity, which should work also with nbdkit.
In my opinion, since there's no known user of agent-based auth passed
via qemu:env, we can break it as it was never really supported.
