Re: [libvirt] [PATCH 0/12] Improve security driver handling & QEMU DAC management

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Tue, Jan 26, 2010 at 10:23:01AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2010 at 12:06:58PM +0200, Dan Kenigsberg wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 03:14:57PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > > This patch series does some work on te security drivers, and the QEMU code
> > > for managing DAC permissions on files. 
> > > 
> > > The core goal is to turn the QEMU driver DAC file management code into a
> > > security driver. Instead of QEMU calling into the SELinux/AppArmour drivers
> > > directly, a stacked driver module is introduced. This delegates all operations
> > > to first the QEMU DAC driver, and then the main SELinux/AppArmour driver. 
> > > The end result is that all the permissions management code is removed from 
> > > the QEMU driver, and we're left with just simple security driver calls.
> > > 
> > > In the process of this a number of flaws in the current hotplug  code were
> > > found, and code was generally tidied up with a view to making it easier to
> > > manage.
> > > 
> > > Finally, we add the ability to turn off the QEMU  DAC file managment code,
> > > and also deal gracefully with failures to change ownership (eg on NFS with
> > > root squash, or readonly FS).
> > 
> > hmmm, there's another problem which this patch set does not address:
> > error : virStorageFileGetMetadata:415 : cannot open file '/deep/into/my/root/squashing/export': Permission denied
> > 
> > With dynamic_ownership = 0, libvirt down not mess with chown, but it now
> > assumes that it can read disk images.
> 
> That is a not unreasonable assumption. The model we want to support is one
> where 
> 
>  - App uses virStoragePool APIs to setup the NFS mount point on the host
>  - App uses virStorageVol APIs to create the new volume with correct
>    ownership at time of creation
>  - libvirt starts the guest, without needing chown() due to step 2
>    getting ownership correct at time of creation.
> 
> If libvirt can't read the directories leading upto the image, then it 
> would never have been able to create the volume in the first place. The
> patchs we have done have aimed at avoiding root squash problems which
> prevent chmod/chown of files between root & non-root. We still assume
> that we can read files / browse directories.

Understood. But if I am handling storage myself, I have a regression
when I switch to libvirt from the sordid art of playing with qemu
directly. I don't want to make my repository world-readable, and I don't
want (yet) to use libvirt storage API.

Do I have a third option?

Note that before this patchset, I could apply a patch disabling chown's
and I managed to start domains over root squashing nfs.


Regards,

Dan.

--
libvir-list mailing list
libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list

[Index of Archives]     [Virt Tools]     [Libvirt Users]     [Lib OS Info]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Big List of Linux Books]     [Yosemite News]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Tools]