+libvir-list On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 05:04:12PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * Eduardo Habkost (ehabkost@xxxxxxxxxx) wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 02:46:52PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > > > * Laszlo Ersek (lersek@xxxxxxxxxx) wrote: > > > > On 06/16/20 19:14, Guilherme Piccoli wrote: > > > > > Thanks Gerd, Dave and Eduardo for the prompt responses! > > > > > > > > > > So, I understand that when we use "-host-physical-bits", we are > > > > > passing the *real* number for the guest, correct? So, in this case we > > > > > can trust that the guest physbits matches the true host physbits. > > > > > > > > > > What if then we have OVMF relying in the physbits *iff* > > > > > "-host-phys-bits" is used (which is the default in RH and a possible > > > > > machine configuration on libvirt XML in Ubuntu), and we have OVMF > > > > > fallbacks to 36-bit otherwise? > > > > > > > > I've now read the commit message on QEMU commit 258fe08bd341d, and the > > > > complexity is simply stunning. > > > > > > > > Right now, OVMF calculates the guest physical address space size from > > > > various range sizes (such as hotplug memory area end, default or > > > > user-configured PCI64 MMIO aperture), and derives the minimum suitable > > > > guest-phys address width from that address space size. This width is > > > > then exposed to the rest of the firmware with the CPU HOB (hand-off > > > > block), which in turn controls how the GCD (global coherency domain) > > > > memory space map is sized. Etc. > > > > > > > > If QEMU can provide a *reliable* GPA width, in some info channel (CPUID > > > > or even fw_cfg), then the above calculation could be reversed in OVMF. > > > > We could take the width as a given (-> produce the CPU HOB directly), > > > > plus calculate the *remaining* address space between the GPA space size > > > > given by the width, and the end of the memory hotplug area end. If the > > > > "remaining size" were negative, then obviously QEMU would have been > > > > misconfigured, so we'd halt the boot. Otherwise, the remaining area > > > > could be used as PCI64 MMIO aperture (PEI memory footprint of DXE page > > > > tables be darned). > > > > > > > > > Now, regarding the problem "to trust or not" in the guests' physbits, > > > > > I think it's an orthogonal discussion to some extent. It'd be nice to > > > > > have that check, and as Eduardo said, prevent migration in such cases. > > > > > But it's not really preventing OVMF big PCI64 aperture if we only > > > > > increase the aperture _when "-host-physical-bits" is used_. > > > > > > > > I don't know what exactly those flags do, but I doubt they are clearly > > > > visible to OVMF in any particular way. > > > > > > The firmware should trust whatever it reads from the cpuid and thus gets > > > told from qemu; if qemu is doing the wrong thing there then that's our > > > problem and we need to fix it in qemu. > > > > It is impossible to provide a MAXPHYADDR that the guest can trust > > unconditionally and allow live migration to hosts with different > > sizes at the same time. > > It would be nice to get to a point where we could say that the reported > size is no bigger than the physical hardware. > The gotcha here is that (upstream) qemu is still reporting 40 by default > when even modern Intel desktop chips are 39. I agree it would be nice. We just need a method to tell guest software that we are really making this additional guarantee. > > > Unless we want to drop support live migration to hosts with > > different sizes entirely, we need additional bits to tell the > > guest how much it can trust MAXPHYADDR. > > Could we go with host-phys-bits=true by default, that at least means the > normal behaviour is correct; if people want to migrate between different > hosts with different sizes they should set phys-bits (or > host-phys-limit) to the lowest in their set of hardware. Host-dependent defaults may be convenient for end users running QEMU directly, but not a good idea if a stable guest ABI is expected from your VM configuration (which is the case for software using the libvirt API). -- Eduardo