On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 05:16:39PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> Invoking the virConnectGetCapabilities() method causes the QEMU
> driver to rebuild its internal capabilities object. Unfortunately
> it was forgetting to register the custom domain status XML hooks
> again.
>
> To avoid this kind of error in the future, the code which builds
> capabilities is refactored into one single method, which can be
> called from all locations, ensuring reliable rebuilds.
>
> * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Fix rebuilding of capabilities XML and
> guarentee it is always consistent
> ---
> src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
> 1 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> index 2d80774..9a3ddfb 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> @@ -892,34 +892,6 @@ qemuReconnectDomains(struct qemud_driver *driver)
>
>
> static int
> -qemudSecurityCapsInit(virSecurityDriverPtr secdrv,
> - virCapsPtr caps)
> -{
> - const char *doi, *model;
> -
> - doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(secdrv);
> - model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(secdrv);
> -
> - caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
> - if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
> - virReportOOMError(NULL);
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> - caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
> - if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
> - virReportOOMError(NULL);
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> - VIR_DEBUG("Initialized caps for security driver \"%s\" with "
> - "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -
> -static int
> qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
> {
> int ret;
> @@ -940,15 +912,52 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
> qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv;
>
> VIR_INFO("Initialized security driver %s", security_drv->name);
> -
> - /*
> - * Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is
> - * initialized.
> - */
> - return qemudSecurityCapsInit(security_drv, qemud_drv->caps);
> + return 0;
> }
>
>
> +static virCapsPtr
> +qemuCreateCapabilities(virCapsPtr oldcaps,
> + virSecurityDriverPtr secDriver)
> +{
> + virCapsPtr caps;
> +
> + /* Basic host arch / guest machine capabilities */
> + if (!(caps = qemudCapsInit(oldcaps))) {
> + virReportOOMError(NULL);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + /* Domain XML parser hooks */
> + caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
> + caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
> + caps->privateDataXMLFormat = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLFormat;
> + caps->privateDataXMLParse = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLParse;
> +
> +
> + /* Security driver data */
> + if (secDriver) {
> + const char *doi, *model;
> +
> + doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(secDriver);
> + model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(secDriver);
> +
> + if (!(caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model)))
> + goto no_memory;
> + if (!(caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi)))
> + goto no_memory;
> +
> + VIR_DEBUG("Initialized caps for security driver \"%s\" with "
> + "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
> + }
> +
> + return caps;
> +
> +no_memory:
> + virReportOOMError(NULL);
> + virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
> + return NULL;
> +}
>
> /**
> * qemudStartup:
> @@ -1074,13 +1083,12 @@ qemudStartup(int privileged) {
> virStrerror(-rc, buf, sizeof(buf)));
> }
>
> - if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit(NULL)) == NULL)
> - goto out_of_memory;
> + if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0)
> + goto error;
>
> - qemu_driver->caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
> - qemu_driver->caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
> - qemu_driver->caps->privateDataXMLFormat = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLFormat;
> - qemu_driver->caps->privateDataXMLParse = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLParse;
> + if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemuCreateCapabilities(NULL,
> + qemu_driver->securityDriver)) == NULL)
> + goto error;
>
> if ((qemu_driver->activePciHostdevs = pciDeviceListNew(NULL)) == NULL)
> goto error;
> @@ -1104,10 +1112,6 @@ qemudStartup(int privileged) {
> }
> }
>
> - if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0) {
> - goto error;
> - }
> -
> /* If hugetlbfs is present, then we need to create a sub-directory within
> * it, since we can't assume the root mount point has permissions that
> * will let our spawned QEMU instances use it.
> @@ -3255,15 +3259,12 @@ static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
> char *xml = NULL;
>
> qemuDriverLock(driver);
> - if ((caps = qemudCapsInit(qemu_driver->caps)) == NULL)
> - goto no_memory;
>
> - caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
> - caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
> -
> - if (qemu_driver->securityDriver &&
> - qemudSecurityCapsInit(qemu_driver->securityDriver, caps) < 0)
> - goto no_memory;
> + if ((caps = qemuCreateCapabilities(qemu_driver->caps,
> + qemu_driver->securityDriver)) == NULL) {
> + virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
>
> virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
> qemu_driver->caps = caps;
> @@ -3275,11 +3276,6 @@ cleanup:
> qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
>
> return xml;
> -
> -no_memory:
> - virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
> - virReportOOMError(conn);
> - goto cleanup;
> }
ACK, this looks cleaner too !
Daniel
--
Daniel Veillard | libxml Gnome XML XSLT toolkit http://xmlsoft.org/
daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxx | Rpmfind RPM search engine http://rpmfind.net/
http://veillard.com/ | virtualization library http://libvirt.org/
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