On 3/9/20 10:44 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
Consider the user creates an image with "-F raw". We can validate the backing
image is raw, and so our check succeeds. Later the malicious <something> can
write a qcow header into this raw file and QEMU will thereafter probe the
image as qcow, not raw.
IOW, in the case of "-F raw", even if we immediately check the format, we're
still not offering the protection promised by the "-F" flag, because that
promise refers to the runtime behaviour of the QEMU emulator, not the
immediate qemu-img cmd.
We could support "-F ..." and validate any non-raw formats, while raising a
runtime error in the case of "-F raw", as only the "raw" backing format has
the probing security risk.
Users who need to use qcow, with a backing file, without a format can
just not pass "-F" and in doing so will be insecure.
And the warning will remind them of that.
We could take this opportunity to deprecate 'qcow' perhaps, declare it
a read-only format, restricted to qemu-img/qemu-io for purpose of data
liberation ?
I'm fine with that, although it makes for a bigger task.
For sheepdog, if it is something we genuinely still care about, then
adding a backing file format record seems neccessary, unless we either
forbid use of raw backing files, or forbid use of non-raw backing files,
either way would be safe.
I concur - as long as you either have ONLY non-raw (in which case
probing is safe), or ONLY raw (in which case no probing is necessary),
then not recording the backing format is safe. It is only for formats
that allow both raw and non-raw backing, but which do not have space in
the image to document which of the two backing formats is expected,
where we have problems.
I'm guessing that qcow works with either raw or qcow as backing format (and
anything else is odd - a qcow2 backing to a qcow is unusual, and would be
better to reject). I'm not sure if sheepdog can be backed by anything but
another sheepdog, similarly, I'm not sure if a vmdk can be backed by
anything but another vmdk. If so, it should be simple enough to do a v4 of
this patch which requires -F to be a known-acceptable probe type for these
images.
Still, the point of this patch is that I want to add -F into all the
iotests, and without something along the lines of this patch, all of those
iotests are broken for these image formats. Patch 2 is a lot harder to
write if we have to make our use of -F conditional on the image format in
question.
--
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226
Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
Regards,
Daniel
--
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3226
Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
