This function will be removed in a future commit because it allows the caller to acquire both monitor and agent jobs at the same time. Holding both job types creates a vulnerability to denial of service from a malicious guest agent. qemuDomainSetVcpusFlags() always passes NONE for either the monitor job or the agent job (and thus is not vulnerable to the DoS), so we can simply replace this function with the functions for acquiring the appropriate type of job. Signed-off-by: Jonathon Jongsma <jjongsma@xxxxxxxxxx> --- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index 1cf54cda8a..921230b8ce 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -5045,8 +5045,6 @@ qemuDomainSetVcpusFlags(virDomainPtr dom, virDomainDefPtr persistentDef; bool hotpluggable = !!(flags & VIR_DOMAIN_VCPU_HOTPLUGGABLE); bool useAgent = !!(flags & VIR_DOMAIN_VCPU_GUEST); - qemuDomainJob job = QEMU_JOB_NONE; - qemuDomainAgentJob agentJob = QEMU_AGENT_JOB_NONE; int ret = -1; virCheckFlags(VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_LIVE | @@ -5061,13 +5059,14 @@ qemuDomainSetVcpusFlags(virDomainPtr dom, if (virDomainSetVcpusFlagsEnsureACL(dom->conn, vm->def, flags) < 0) goto cleanup; - if (useAgent) - agentJob = QEMU_AGENT_JOB_MODIFY; - else - job = QEMU_JOB_MODIFY; - if (qemuDomainObjBeginJobWithAgent(driver, vm, job, agentJob) < 0) - goto cleanup; + if (useAgent) { + if (qemuDomainObjBeginAgentJob(driver, vm, QEMU_AGENT_JOB_MODIFY) < 0) + goto cleanup; + } else { + if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0) + goto cleanup; + } if (virDomainObjGetDefs(vm, flags, &def, &persistentDef) < 0) goto endjob; @@ -5081,7 +5080,7 @@ qemuDomainSetVcpusFlags(virDomainPtr dom, nvcpus, hotpluggable); endjob: - if (agentJob) + if (useAgent) qemuDomainObjEndAgentJob(vm); else qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm); -- 2.21.0 -- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list