On 9/5/19 1:56 PM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
When opening a connection to a second driver inside the daemon, we must
ensure the identity of the current user is passed across. This allows
the second daemon to perform access control checks against the real end
users, instead of against the libvirt daemon that's proxying across the
API calls.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/libvirt_remote.syms | 1 +
src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
src/remote/remote_driver.c | 1 +
src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 16 +++-
src/remote_protocol-structs | 8 ++
src/rpc/virnetserverclient.c | 12 +++
src/rpc/virnetserverclient.h | 2 +
7 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
/* Define the program number, protocol version and procedure numbers here. */
@@ -6603,5 +6611,11 @@ enum remote_procedure {
* @generate: none
* @acl: domain:write
*/
- REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_GUEST_INFO = 418
+ REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_GUEST_INFO = 418,
+
+ /**
+ * @generate: client
+ * @acl: connect:write
+ */
+ REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_SET_IDENTITY = 419
IIUC, the only thing that stops a malicious user from switching identity
is that they have write access on the opened connection?
Because on one hand we want secondary daemons to accept identity
switches from the proxy daemon, but at the same time we don't want users
to do that.
Code-wise, patches are good and I'd ACK them, but this is a bit unclear
to me so I'd like to understand it more first.
};
diff --git a/src/remote_protocol-structs b/src/remote_protocol-structs
index 616c3d5d52..71169c4148 100644
--- a/src/remote_protocol-structs
+++ b/src/remote_protocol-structs
@@ -3115,6 +3115,13 @@ struct remote_domain_get_guest_info_ret {
u_int params_len;
remote_typed_param * params_val;
} params;
+}
s/}/};/
+struct remote_connect_set_identity_args {
+ struct {
+ u_int params_len;
+ remote_typed_param * params_val;
+ } params;
+ u_int flags;
};
Michal
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