On Mon, Feb 04, 2019 at 04:32:52PM +0100, Peter Krempa wrote: > On Mon, Feb 04, 2019 at 16:26:02 +0100, Peter Krempa wrote: > > It will not work. This breaks qemu capabilities probing as a user. > > --- > > src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 3 ++- > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c > > index 7ed5f94803..81ef0357e7 100644 > > --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c > > +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c > > @@ -4524,7 +4524,8 @@ virQEMUCapsInitQMPCommandRun(virQEMUCapsInitQMPCommandPtr cmd, > > #if WITH_CAPNG > > /* QEMU might run into permission issues, e.g. /dev/sev (0600), override > > * them just for the purpose of probing */ > > - virCommandAllowCap(cmd->cmd, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE); > > + if (geteuid() == 0) > > Possibly replacing this with driver->privileged for the qemu driver but > that is not easily accessible. It doesn't really matter as privileged == (geteuid() == 0) since we purged the hack for Solaris that tried to run privileged libvirtd as non-root for Xen. We've got many other cases using geteuid() == 0 where they cannot access the 'privileged' flag alrady. Regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :| -- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list
