On Fri, 04 Sep 2009, Jamie Strandboge wrote: > [PATCH 5] > patch_5_docs.patch: -- Jamie Strandboge | http://www.canonical.com
diff -Nurp ./libvirt.orig/docs/drvqemu.html.in ./libvirt/docs/drvqemu.html.in
--- ./libvirt.orig/docs/drvqemu.html.in 2009-09-02 14:34:08.000000000 -0500
+++ ./libvirt/docs/drvqemu.html.in 2009-09-04 09:34:57.000000000 -0500
@@ -296,6 +296,72 @@
file can be used to change the setting to <code>security_driver="none"</code>
</p>
+ <h3><a name="securitysvirtaa">AppArmor sVirt confinement</a></h3>
+
+ <p>
+ When using basic AppArmor protection for the libvirtd daemon and
+ QEMU virtual machines, the intention is to protect the host OS
+ from a compromised virtual machine process. There is no protection
+ between guests.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ The AppArmor sVirt protection for QEMU virtual machines builds on
+ this basic level of protection, to also allow individual guests to
+ be protected from each other.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ In the sVirt model, if a profile is loaded for the libvirtd daemon,
+ then each <code>qemu:///system</code> QEMU virtual machine will run
+ starts. This generated profile uses a profile name based on the UUID
+ of the QEMU virtual machine and contains rules allowing access to
+ only the files it needs to run, such as its disks, pid file and log
+ files. Just before the QEMU virtual machine is started, the libvirtd
+ daemon will change into this unique profile, preventing the QEMU
+ process from accessing any file resources that are present in another
+ QEMU process or the host machine.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ The AppArmor sVirt implementation is flexible in that it allows an
+ administrator to customize the template file in
+ <code>/etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE</code> for site-specific
+ access for all newly created QEMU virtual machines. Also, when a new
+ profile is generated, two files are created:
+ <code>/etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-<uuid></code> and
+ <code>/etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-<uuid>.files</code>. The
+ former can be fine-tuned by the administrator to allow custom access
+ for this particular QEMU virtual machine, and the latter will be
+ updated appropriately when required file access changes, such as when
+ a disk is added. This flexibility allows for situations such as
+ having one virtual machine in complain mode with all others in
+ enforce mode.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ While users can define their own AppArmor profile scheme, a typical
+ configuration will include a profile for <code>/usr/sbin/libvirtd</code>,
+ <code>/usr/bin/virt-aa-helper</code> (a helper program which the
+ libvirtd daemon uses instead of manipulating AppArmor directly), and
+ an abstraction to be included by <code>/etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE</code>
+ (typically <code>/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu</code>).
+ An example profile scheme can be found in the examples/apparmor
+ directory of the source distribution.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ If the sVirt security model is active, then the node capabilities
+ XML will include its details. If a virtual machine is currently
+ protected by the security model, then the guest XML will include
+ its assigned profile name. If enabled at compile time, the sVirt
+ security model will be activated if AppArmor is available on the host
+ OS and a profile for the libvirtd daemon is loaded when libvirtd is
+ started. To disable sVirt, and revert to the basic level of AppArmor
+ protection (host protection only), the <code>/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf</code>
+ file can be used to change the setting to <code>security_driver="none"</code>.
+ </p>
+
<h3><a name="securityacl">Cgroups device ACLs</a></h3>
diff -Nurp ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu
--- ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu 2009-09-04 09:35:31.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# Last Modified: Wed Jul 8 09:57:41 2009
+
+ #include <abstractions/base>
+ #include <abstractions/consoles>
+ #include <abstractions/nameservice>
+
+ # required for reading disk images
+ capability dac_override,
+ capability dac_read_search,
+
+ network inet stream,
+ network inet6 stream,
+
+ /dev/net/tun rw,
+ /dev/kvm rw,
+ /dev/ptmx rw,
+ /dev/kqemu rw,
+
+ # WARNING: uncommenting these gives the guest direct access to host hardware.
+ # This is required for USB pass through but is a security risk. You have been
+ # warned.
+ #/sys/bus/usb/devices/ r,
+ #/sys/devices/*/*/usb[0-9]*/** r,
+ #/dev/bus/usb/*/[0-9]* rw,
+
+ /usr/share/kvm/** r,
+ /usr/share/qemu/** r,
+ /usr/share/bochs/** r,
+ /usr/share/openbios/** r,
+ /usr/share/openhackware/** r,
+ /usr/share/proll/** r,
+ /usr/share/vgabios/** r,
+
+ # the various binaries
+ /usr/bin/kvm rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-arm rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-cris rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-m68k rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-mips rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-mips64 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-mips64el rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-mipsel rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-ppc rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-ppc64 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-ppcemb rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-sh4 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-sh4eb rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-sparc rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-sparc64 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-alpha rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-arm rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-armeb rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-cris rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-i386 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-m68k rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-mips rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-mipsel rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-ppc rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-ppc64 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-ppc64abi32 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-sh4 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-sh4eb rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-sparc rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-sparc64 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-sparc32plus rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-sparc64 rmix,
+ /usr/bin/qemu-x86_64 rmix,
+
diff -Nurp ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/TEMPLATE ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/TEMPLATE
--- ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/TEMPLATE 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/TEMPLATE 2009-09-04 09:35:38.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#
+# This profile is for the domain whose UUID matches this file.
+#
+
+#include <tunables/global>
+
+profile LIBVIRT_TEMPLATE {
+ #include <abstractions/libvirt-qemu>
+}
diff -Nurp ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/usr.bin.virt-aa-helper ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/usr.bin.virt-aa-helper
--- ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/usr.bin.virt-aa-helper 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/usr.bin.virt-aa-helper 2009-09-04 09:35:17.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Last Modified: Mon Jul 06 17:22:37 2009
+#include <tunables/global>
+
+/usr/bin/virt-aa-helper {
+ #include <abstractions/base>
+
+ # needed for searching directories
+ capability dac_override,
+ capability dac_read_search,
+
+ # needed for when disk is on a network filesystem
+ network inet,
+
+ deny @{PROC}/[0-9]*/mounts r,
+ @{PROC}/filesystems r,
+
+ /usr/bin/virt-aa-helper mr,
+ /sbin/apparmor_parser Ux,
+
+ /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/* r,
+ /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]* rw,
+}
diff -Nurp ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd
--- ./libvirt.orig/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ ./libvirt/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd 2009-09-04 09:39:02.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Last Modified: Mon Jul 6 17:23:58 2009
+#include <tunables/global>
+@{LIBVIRT}="libvirt"
+
+/usr/sbin/libvirtd {
+ #include <abstractions/base>
+
+ capability kill,
+ capability net_admin,
+ capability net_raw,
+ capability setgid,
+ capability sys_admin,
+ capability sys_module,
+ capability sys_ptrace,
+
+ network inet stream,
+
+ # Very lenient profile for libvirtd since we want to first focus on confining
+ # the guests. Guests will have a very restricted profile.
+ /** rwmkl,
+
+ /bin/* Ux,
+ /sbin/* Ux,
+ /usr/bin/* Ux,
+ /usr/sbin/* Ux,
+
+ # force the use of virt-aa-helper
+ audit deny /sbin/apparmor_parser rwxl,
+ audit deny /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/** wxl,
+ audit deny /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features rwxl,
+ audit deny /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/matching rwxl,
+ audit deny /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.* rwxl,
+ /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/profiles r,
+ /usr/bin/virt-aa-helper Pxr,
+
+ # allow changing to our UUID-based named profiles
+ change_profile -> @{LIBVIRT}-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]*-[0-9a-f]*,
+
+}
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