On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 02:06:10PM -0500, Richard Relph wrote: > Whether the "BIOS" is a "static shim" as Michael suggests, or a full BIOS, > or even a BIOS+kernel+initrd is really not too significant. What is > significant is that the GO has a basis for trusting all code that is > imported in to their VM by the CP. And that NONE of the code provided by the > CP is "unknown" and unauditable by the GO. If the CP has a way to inject > code unknown to the GO in to the guest VM, the trust model is broken and > both GO and CP suffer the consequences. Absolutely. > When the CP needs to update the BIOS image, they will have to inform the GO > and allow the GO to establish trust in the CP's new BIOS image somehow. This GO update on every BIOS change is imho is not a workable model. You want something like checking the BIOS signature instead. And since hardware is all hash based, you need the shim to do it in software. -- MST -- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list
