Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Daniel P. Berrange (berrange@xxxxxxxxxx):
>
>> This patch updates the LXC driver to make use of libcap-ng for managing
>> process capabilities. Previously Ryota Ozaki had provided code to remove
>> the CAP_BOOT capabilities inside the container, preventing host reboots.
>> In addition to that one, I believe we should be removing ability to
>> load kernel modules, change the system clock and changing audit/MAC.
>> So this patch also clears the following:
>>
>> CAP_SYS_MODULE, /* No kernel module loading */
>> CAP_SYS_TIME, /* No changing the clock */
>> CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL, /* No messing with auditing */
>> CAP_AUDIT_WRITE, /* No messing with auditing */
>> CAP_MAC_ADMIN, /* No messing with LSM */
>> CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, /* No messing with LSM */
>>
What is going to run inside your container? Turning off the MAC
capabilities can seriously limit the programs that can run inside
it. If you can't drop CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or CAP_KILL it's unlikely
that it makes sense to drop CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE. Similarly, if you
can't drop CAP_FOWNER or CAP_CHOWN you'll probably be ill advised
to forgo CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
>
> Thanks, Daniel, this does look good. I wonder whether there is a more
> appropriate list to email caps-related patches (including libcap-ng
> itself) to. Not only does the code itself warrant discussion (for
> instance, should capng_lock() also set CAP_NOSUID_FIXUP?), but such
> discussions, in one place, about converting several programs to dropping
> capabilities would help others to do the same with this code.
>
> I can't think of anything other than the LSM list, so I'm cc:ing it
> here.
>
>
>> We use libcap-ng's capng_updatev/apply functions to remove these from
>> the permitted, inheritable, effective and bounding sets. Then we use
>> capng_lock to set NOROOT and NOROOT_LOCKED in the process securebits
>> to prevent them ever being re-acquired.
>>
>> The other thing I realized is that the 'libvirt_lxc' controller process
>> does not need to keep any capabilities at all once it has spawned the
>> container process, since all its doing is forwarding I/O between 2 open
>> file descripts. So I also clear all capabilities from that. We should
>> probably make it chuid/gid to a non-root user in future too.
>>
>> lxc_container.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>> lxc_controller.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Daniel
>>
>> diff -r 7e766489c4a2 src/lxc_container.c
>> --- a/src/lxc_container.c Tue Jun 23 11:13:45 2009 +0100
>> +++ b/src/lxc_container.c Tue Jun 23 11:54:10 2009 +0100
>> @@ -41,8 +41,9 @@
>> /* For MS_MOVE */
>> #include <linux/fs.h>
>>
>> -#include <sys/prctl.h>
>> -#include <linux/capability.h>
>> +#if HAVE_CAPNG
>> +#include <cap-ng.h>
>> +#endif
>>
>> #include "virterror_internal.h"
>> #include "logging.h"
>> @@ -642,27 +643,50 @@ static int lxcContainerSetupMounts(virDo
>> return lxcContainerSetupExtraMounts(vmDef);
>> }
>>
>> -static int lxcContainerDropCapabilities(virDomainDefPtr vmDef ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * This is running as the 'init' process insid the container.
>> + * It removes some capabilities that could be dangerous to
>> + * host system, since they are not currently "containerized"
>> + */
>> +static int lxcContainerDropCapabilities(void)
>> {
>> -#ifdef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
>> - int i;
>> - const struct {
>> - int id;
>> - const char *name;
>> - } caps[] = {
>> -#define ID_STRING(name) name, #name
>> - { ID_STRING(CAP_SYS_BOOT) },
>> - };
>> +#if HAVE_CAPNG
>> + int ret;
>>
>> - for (i = 0 ; i < ARRAY_CARDINALITY(caps) ; i++) {
>> - if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, caps[i].id, 0, 0, 0)) {
>> - lxcError(NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
>> - _("failed to drop %s"), caps[i].name);
>> - return -1;
>> - }
>> + capng_get_caps_process();
>> +
>> + if ((ret = capng_updatev(CAPNG_DROP,
>> + CAPNG_EFFECTIVE | CAPNG_PERMITTED |
>> + CAPNG_INHERITABLE | CAPNG_BOUNDING_SET,
>> + CAP_SYS_BOOT, /* No use of reboot */
>> + CAP_SYS_MODULE, /* No kernel module loading */
>> + CAP_SYS_TIME, /* No changing the clock */
>> + CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL, /* No messing with auditing */
>> + CAP_AUDIT_WRITE, /* No messing with auditing */
>> + CAP_MAC_ADMIN, /* No messing with LSM */
>> + CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, /* No messing with LSM */
>> + -1 /* sentinal */)) < 0) {
>> + lxcError(NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
>> + _("failed to remove capabilities %d"), ret);
>> + return -1;
>> }
>> -#else /* ! PR_CAPBSET_DROP */
>> - VIR_WARN0(_("failed to drop capabilities PR_CAPBSET_DROP undefined"));
>> +
>> + if ((ret = capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH)) < 0) {
>> + lxcError(NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
>> + _("failed to apply capabilities: %d"), ret);
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>>
>
> The only problem offhand with this idiom is that you need CAP_SETPCAP to
> set securebits and drop caps from bounding set, but I think a lot of
> applications could stand to drop CAP_SETPCAP otherwise. So I don't know
> if it would help to do the capng_lock() before capng_apply().
>
> (To be clear, not bc you need to do so right here, but because others
> may well look at your code as example code.)
>
>
>> + /* Need to prevent them regaining any caps on exec */
>> + if ((ret = capng_lock()) < 0) {
>> + lxcError(NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
>> + _("failed to lock capabilities: %d"), ret);
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> +
>> +#else
>> + VIR_WARN0(_("libcap-ng support not compiled in, unable to clear capabilities"));
>> #endif
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -735,7 +759,7 @@ static int lxcContainerChild( void *data
>> return -1;
>>
>> /* drop a set of root capabilities */
>> - if (lxcContainerDropCapabilities(vmDef) < 0)
>> + if (lxcContainerDropCapabilities() < 0)
>> return -1;
>>
>> /* this function will only return if an error occured */
>> diff -r 7e766489c4a2 src/lxc_controller.c
>> --- a/src/lxc_controller.c Tue Jun 23 11:13:45 2009 +0100
>> +++ b/src/lxc_controller.c Tue Jun 23 11:54:10 2009 +0100
>> @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
>> #include <getopt.h>
>> #include <sys/mount.h>
>>
>> +#if HAVE_CAPNG
>> +#include <cap-ng.h>
>> +#endif
>> +
>> #include "virterror_internal.h"
>> #include "logging.h"
>> #include "util.h"
>> @@ -210,6 +214,25 @@ cleanup:
>> return rc;
>> }
>>
>> +
>> +static int lxcControllerClearCapabilities(void)
>> +{
>> +#if HAVE_CAPNG
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
>> +
>> + if ((ret = capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH)) < 0) {
>> + lxcError(NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
>> + _("failed to apply capabilities: %d"), ret);
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> +#else
>> + VIR_WARN0(_("libcap-ng support not compiled in, unable to clear capabilities"));
>> +#endif
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> typedef struct _lxcTtyForwardFd_t {
>> int fd;
>> int active;
>> @@ -562,6 +585,11 @@ lxcControllerRun(virDomainDefPtr def,
>> if (lxcContainerSendContinue(control[0]) < 0)
>> goto cleanup;
>>
>> + /* Now the container is running, there's no need for us to keep
>> + any elevated capabilities */
>> + if (lxcControllerClearCapabilities() < 0)
>> + goto cleanup;
>> +
>> rc = lxcControllerMain(monitor, client, appPty, containerPty);
>>
>> cleanup:
>>
>>
>> --
>> |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :|
>> |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :|
>> |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
>> |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|
>>
>> --
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>>
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