Re: [PATCH] AppArmor: allow QEMU to set_process_name.

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Mon, 2016-12-05 at 11:21 +0000, intrigeri wrote:
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1369281
> ---
>  examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu b/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu
> index 11381d4df0..a07291d583 100644
> --- a/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu
> +++ b/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
>    /dev/ptmx rw,
>    /dev/kqemu rw,
>    @{PROC}/*/status r,
> +  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/@{tid}/comm rw,
>    @{PROC}/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap r,
>  

This rule would allow any confined guest to change the 'comm' value of any task
on the system, if the system otherwise allowed it. These days that would likely
be mitigated somewhat by DAC protections (ie, when qemu is run as non-root).
Other than DAC (and MAC), what other protections exist that might make this rule
 acceptable?

-- 
Jamie Strandboge             | http://www.canonical.com

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part

--
libvir-list mailing list
libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list

[Index of Archives]     [Virt Tools]     [Libvirt Users]     [Lib OS Info]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Big List of Linux Books]     [Yosemite News]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Tools]
  Powered by Linux