[libvirt] Updated James Morris patch to apply to libvirt-0.6.0 version

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Is this acceptable to upstream?

Dan
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Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

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diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in
--- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt	2009-01-20 08:48:27.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in	2009-02-17 10:07:06.215686000 -0500
@@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum {
 } virDomainCreateFlags;
 
 /**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string.
+ * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(),
+ * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified
+ * domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityLabel {
+    char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN];    /* security label string */
+    int enforcing;                            /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */
+} virSecurityLabel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr;
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(),
+ * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the
+ * specified domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityModel {
+    char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN];      /* security model string */
+    char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];          /* domain of interpetation */
+} virSecurityModel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr;
+
+/**
  * virNodeInfoPtr:
  *
  * a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing
@@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char *                  virConnectGetCap
 
 unsigned long long      virNodeGetFreeMemory    (virConnectPtr conn);
 
+int                     virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn,
+                                                 virSecurityModelPtr secmodel);
+
 /*
  * Gather list of running domains
  */
@@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int                     virDomainSetMaxM
 int                     virDomainSetMemory      (virDomainPtr domain,
                                                  unsigned long memory);
 int                     virDomainGetMaxVcpus    (virDomainPtr domain);
+int                     virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain,
+                                                   virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel);
 
 /*
  * XML domain description
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt	2009-01-31 04:20:10.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h	2009-02-17 10:07:32.421570000 -0500
@@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum {
 } virDomainCreateFlags;
 
 /**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string.
+ * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(),
+ * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified
+ * domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityLabel {
+    char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN];    /* security label string */
+    int enforcing;                            /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */
+} virSecurityLabel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr;
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(),
+ * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the
+ * specified domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityModel {
+    char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN];      /* security model string */
+    char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];          /* domain of interpetation */
+} virSecurityModel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr;
+
+/**
  * virNodeInfoPtr:
  *
  * a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing
@@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char *                  virConnectGetCap
 
 unsigned long long      virNodeGetFreeMemory    (virConnectPtr conn);
 
+int                     virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn,
+                                                 virSecurityModelPtr secmodel);
+
 /*
  * Gather list of running domains
  */
@@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int                     virDomainSetMaxM
 int                     virDomainSetMemory      (virDomainPtr domain,
                                                  unsigned long memory);
 int                     virDomainGetMaxVcpus    (virDomainPtr domain);
+int                     virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain,
+                                                   virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel);
 
 /*
  * XML domain description
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt	2008-11-25 08:42:33.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.223677000 -0500
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ typedef enum {
     VIR_FROM_UML,       /* Error at the UML driver */
     VIR_FROM_NODEDEV, /* Error from node device monitor */
     VIR_FROM_XEN_INOTIFY, /* Error from xen inotify layer */
+    VIR_FROM_SECURITY,  /* Error from security framework */
 } virErrorDomain;
 
 
@@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ typedef enum {
     VIR_WAR_NO_NODE, /* failed to start node driver */
     VIR_ERR_INVALID_NODE_DEVICE,/* invalid node device object */
     VIR_ERR_NO_NODE_DEVICE,/* node device not found */
+    VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL, /* security model not found */
 } virErrorNumber;
 
 /**
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in
--- libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in	2009-02-17 10:07:06.226679000 -0500
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ src/proxy_internal.c
 src/qemu_conf.c
 src/qemu_driver.c
 src/remote_internal.c
+src/security.c
+src/security_selinux.c
 src/storage_backend.c
 src/storage_backend_disk.c
 src/storage_backend_fs.c
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py
--- libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt	2008-11-21 07:47:32.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py	2009-02-17 10:07:06.230676000 -0500
@@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ skip_function = (
     'virCopyLastError', # Python API is called virGetLastError instead
     'virConnectOpenAuth', # Python C code is manually written
     'virDefaultErrorFunc', # Python virErrorFuncHandler impl calls this from C
+    'virDomainGetSecurityLabel', # Needs investigation...
+    'virNodeGetSecurityModel', # Needs investigation...
     'virConnectDomainEventRegister',   # overridden in virConnect.py
     'virConnectDomainEventDeregister', # overridden in virConnect.py
 )
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am	2009-02-17 10:07:06.237678000 -0500
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_
 endif
 endif
 
+libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_security.la
 libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt.la
 
 if HAVE_POLKIT
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.246680000 -0500
@@ -1340,6 +1340,76 @@ remoteDispatchDomainGetMaxVcpus (struct 
 }
 
 static int
+remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                     struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                     virConnectPtr conn,
+                                     remote_error *rerr,
+                                     remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args,
+                                     remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret)
+{
+    virDomainPtr dom;
+    virSecurityLabel seclabel;
+
+    dom = get_nonnull_domain(conn, args->dom);
+    if (dom == NULL) {
+        remoteDispatchConnError(rerr, conn);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel);
+    if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) {
+        virDomainFree(dom);
+        remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security label"));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ret->label.label_len = strlen(seclabel.label) + 1;
+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->label.label_val, ret->label.label_len) < 0) {
+        virDomainFree(dom);
+        remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    strcpy(ret->label.label_val, seclabel.label);
+    ret->enforcing = seclabel.enforcing;
+    virDomainFree(dom);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                   struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                   virConnectPtr conn,
+                                   remote_error *rerr,
+                                   void *args ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+                                   remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret)
+{
+    virSecurityModel secmodel;
+
+    memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel);
+    if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(conn, &secmodel) == -1) {
+        remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security model"));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    ret->model.model_len = strlen(secmodel.model) + 1;
+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->model.model_val, ret->model.model_len) < 0) {
+        remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    strcpy(ret->model.model_val, secmodel.model);
+
+    ret->doi.doi_len = strlen(secmodel.doi) + 1;
+    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->doi.doi_val, ret->doi.doi_len) < 0) {
+        remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    strcpy(ret->doi.doi_val, secmodel.doi);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
 remoteDispatchDomainGetOsType (struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
                                struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
                                virConnectPtr conn,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt	2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.250678000 -0500
@@ -99,3 +99,4 @@
     remote_node_device_get_parent_args val_remote_node_device_get_parent_args;
     remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args;
     remote_node_device_list_caps_args val_remote_node_device_list_caps_args;
+    remote_domain_get_security_label_args val_remote_domain_get_security_label_args;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt	2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.255676000 -0500
@@ -184,6 +184,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSchedu
     remote_error *err,
     remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_args *args,
     remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_ret *ret);
+static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel(
+    struct qemud_server *server,
+    struct qemud_client *client,
+    virConnectPtr conn,
+    remote_error *err,
+    remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args,
+    remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret);
 static int remoteDispatchDomainGetVcpus(
     struct qemud_server *server,
     struct qemud_client *client,
@@ -576,6 +583,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchNodeGetInfo(
     remote_error *err,
     void *args,
     remote_node_get_info_ret *ret);
+static int remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel(
+    struct qemud_server *server,
+    struct qemud_client *client,
+    virConnectPtr conn,
+    remote_error *err,
+    void *args,
+    remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret);
 static int remoteDispatchNodeListDevices(
     struct qemud_server *server,
     struct qemud_client *client,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt	2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.259676000 -0500
@@ -86,3 +86,5 @@
     remote_node_device_get_parent_ret val_remote_node_device_get_parent_ret;
     remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret;
     remote_node_device_list_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret;
+    remote_domain_get_security_label_ret val_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret;
+    remote_node_get_security_model_ret val_remote_node_get_security_model_ret;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt	2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.263676000 -0500
@@ -592,3 +592,13 @@
     .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_args,
     .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret,
 },
+{   /* DomainGetSecurityLabel => 118 */
+    .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel,
+    .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args,
+    .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret,
+},
+{   /* NodeGetSecurityModel => 119 */
+    .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel,
+    .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_void,
+    .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret,
+},
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.268676000 -0500
@@ -1166,6 +1166,43 @@ xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR
 }
 
 bool_t
+xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_args *objp)
+{
+
+         if (!xdr_remote_nonnull_domain (xdrs, &objp->dom))
+                 return FALSE;
+        return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool_t
+xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *objp)
+{
+        char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->label.label_val;
+
+         if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->label.label_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX,
+                sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char))
+                 return FALSE;
+         if (!xdr_int (xdrs, &objp->enforcing))
+                 return FALSE;
+        return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool_t
+xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_node_get_security_model_ret *objp)
+{
+        char **objp_cpp1 = (char **) (void *) &objp->doi.doi_val;
+        char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->model.model_val;
+
+         if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->model.model_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX,
+                sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char))
+                 return FALSE;
+         if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp1, (u_int *) &objp->doi.doi_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX,
+                sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char))
+                 return FALSE;
+        return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool_t
 xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_attach_device_args *objp)
 {
 
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.274679000 -0500
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ typedef remote_nonnull_string *remote_st
 #define REMOTE_AUTH_TYPE_LIST_MAX 20
 #define REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536
 #define REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536
+#define REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN
+#define REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN
+#define REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN
 
 typedef char remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN];
 
@@ -637,6 +640,32 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret {
 };
 typedef struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret;
 
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args {
+        remote_nonnull_domain dom;
+};
+typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args remote_domain_get_security_label_args;
+
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret {
+        struct {
+                u_int label_len;
+                char *label_val;
+        } label;
+        int enforcing;
+};
+typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret remote_domain_get_security_label_ret;
+
+struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret {
+        struct {
+                u_int model_len;
+                char *model_val;
+        } model;
+        struct {
+                u_int doi_len;
+                char *doi_val;
+        } doi;
+};
+typedef struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret remote_node_get_security_model_ret;
+
 struct remote_domain_attach_device_args {
         remote_nonnull_domain dom;
         remote_nonnull_string xml;
@@ -1348,6 +1377,8 @@ enum remote_procedure {
         REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115,
         REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116,
         REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117,
+        REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118,
+        REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119,
 };
 typedef enum remote_procedure remote_procedure;
 
@@ -1474,6 +1505,9 @@ extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcp
 extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret*);
 extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args*);
 extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret*);
+extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_args*);
+extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret*);
+extern  bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *, remote_node_get_security_model_ret*);
 extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_attach_device_args*);
 extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_detach_device_args*);
 extern  bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_autostart_args*);
@@ -1679,6 +1713,9 @@ extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpu
 extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret ();
 extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args ();
 extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret ();
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args ();
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret ();
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret ();
 extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args ();
 extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args ();
 extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args ();
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt	2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x	2009-02-17 10:07:06.279676000 -0500
@@ -115,6 +115,21 @@ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MA
  */
 const REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX = 65536;
 
+/*
+ * Maximum length of a security model field.
+ */
+const REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN;
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of a security label field.
+ */
+const REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN;
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of a security DOI field.
+ */
+const REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN;
+
 /* UUID.  VIR_UUID_BUFLEN definition comes from libvirt.h */
 typedef opaque remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN];
 
@@ -617,6 +632,20 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret {
     int num;
 };
 
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args {
+    remote_nonnull_domain dom;
+};
+
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret {
+    char label<REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX>;
+    int enforcing;
+};
+
+struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret {
+    char model<REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX>;
+    char doi<REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX>;
+};
+
 struct remote_domain_attach_device_args {
     remote_nonnull_domain dom;
     remote_nonnull_string xml;
@@ -1223,7 +1252,10 @@ enum remote_procedure {
     REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_DUMP_XML = 114,
     REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115,
     REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116,
-    REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117
+    REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117,
+
+    REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118,
+    REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119
 };
 
 /* Custom RPC structure. */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.285678000 -0500
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ virCapabilitiesFree(virCapsPtr caps) {
     VIR_FREE(caps->host.migrateTrans);
 
     VIR_FREE(caps->host.arch);
+    VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.model);
+    VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.doi);
     VIR_FREE(caps);
 }
 
@@ -599,6 +601,14 @@ virCapabilitiesFormatXML(virCapsPtr caps
         virBufferAddLit(&xml, "      </cells>\n");
         virBufferAddLit(&xml, "    </topology>\n");
     }
+
+    if (caps->host.secModel.model) {
+        virBufferAddLit(&xml, "    <secmodel>\n");
+        virBufferVSprintf(&xml, "      <model>%s</model>\n", caps->host.secModel.model);
+        virBufferVSprintf(&xml, "      <doi>%s</doi>\n", caps->host.secModel.doi);
+        virBufferAddLit(&xml, "    </secmodel>\n");
+    }
+
     virBufferAddLit(&xml, "  </host>\n\n");
 
 
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.292677000 -0500
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ struct _virCapsHostNUMACell {
     int *cpus;
 };
 
+typedef struct _virCapsHostSecModel virCapsHostSecModel;
+struct _virCapsHostSecModel {
+    char *model;
+    char *doi;
+};
+
 typedef struct _virCapsHost virCapsHost;
 typedef virCapsHost *virCapsHostPtr;
 struct _virCapsHost {
@@ -90,6 +96,7 @@ struct _virCapsHost {
     char **migrateTrans;
     int nnumaCell;
     virCapsHostNUMACellPtr *numaCell;
+    virCapsHostSecModel secModel;
 };
 
 typedef struct _virCaps virCaps;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt	2009-02-17 10:07:06.195708000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.300677000 -0500
@@ -379,6 +379,16 @@ void virDomainDeviceDefFree(virDomainDev
     VIR_FREE(def);
 }
 
+void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def);
+
+void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def)
+{
+    if (def->seclabel.model)
+        VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.model);
+    if (def->seclabel.label)
+        VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.label);
+}
+
 void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def)
 {
     unsigned int i;
@@ -437,6 +447,8 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr de
     VIR_FREE(def->cpumask);
     VIR_FREE(def->emulator);
 
+    virSecurityLabelDefFree(def);
+
     VIR_FREE(def);
 }
 
@@ -1818,6 +1830,34 @@ static int virDomainLifecycleParseXML(vi
     return 0;
 }
 
+static int
+virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(virConnectPtr conn,
+                            const virDomainDefPtr def,
+                            xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt)
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    if (virXPathNode(conn, "./seclabel", ctxt) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])",
+                            VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt);
+    if (p == NULL)
+        goto error;
+    def->seclabel.label = p;
+
+    p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)",
+                            VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt);
+    if (p == NULL)
+        goto error;
+    def->seclabel.model = p;
+
+    return 0;
+
+error:
+    virSecurityLabelDefFree(def);
+    return -1;
+}
 
 virDomainDeviceDefPtr virDomainDeviceDefParse(virConnectPtr conn,
                                               virCapsPtr caps,
@@ -2403,6 +2443,10 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParse
     }
     VIR_FREE(nodes);
 
+    /* analysis of security label */
+    if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt) == -1)
+        goto error;
+
     return def;
 
 no_memory:
@@ -3420,6 +3464,13 @@ char *virDomainDefFormat(virConnectPtr c
             goto cleanup;
 
     virBufferAddLit(&buf, "  </devices>\n");
+
+    if (def->seclabel.model) {
+        virBufferEscapeString(&buf, "  <seclabel model='%s'>\n", def->seclabel.model);
+        virBufferEscapeString(&buf, "    <label>%s</label>\n", def->seclabel.label);
+        virBufferAddLit(&buf, "  </seclabel>\n");
+    }
+
     virBufferAddLit(&buf, "</domain>\n");
 
     if (virBufferError(&buf))
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.307676000 -0500
@@ -407,6 +407,14 @@ struct _virDomainOSDef {
     char *bootloaderArgs;
 };
 
+/* Security configuration for domain */
+typedef struct _virSecurityLabelDef virSecurityLabelDef;
+typedef virSecurityLabelDef *virSecurityLabelDefPtr;
+struct _virSecurityLabelDef {
+    char *model;        /* name of security model */
+    char *label;        /* security label string */
+};
+
 #define VIR_DOMAIN_CPUMASK_LEN 1024
 
 /* Guest VM main configuration */
@@ -464,6 +472,7 @@ struct _virDomainDef {
 
     /* Only 1 */
     virDomainChrDefPtr console;
+    virSecurityLabelDef seclabel;
 };
 
 /* Guest VM runtime state */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt	2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.313676000 -0500
@@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ typedef int
 typedef int
         (*virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus)	(virDomainPtr domain);
 typedef int
+        (*virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel)	(virDomainPtr domain,
+                                         virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel);
+typedef int
+        (*virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel)	(virConnectPtr conn,
+                                         virSecurityModelPtr secmodel);
+typedef int
         (*virDrvDomainAttachDevice)	(virDomainPtr domain,
                                          const char *xml);
 typedef int
@@ -361,6 +367,8 @@ struct _virDriver {
     virDrvDomainPinVcpu		domainPinVcpu;
     virDrvDomainGetVcpus		domainGetVcpus;
     virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus		domainGetMaxVcpus;
+    virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel     domainGetSecurityLabel;
+    virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel  nodeGetSecurityModel;
     virDrvDomainDumpXML		domainDumpXML;
     virDrvListDefinedDomains	listDefinedDomains;
     virDrvNumOfDefinedDomains	numOfDefinedDomains;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.332683000 -0500
@@ -4156,6 +4156,70 @@ error:
     return -1;
 }
 
+/**
+ * virDomainGetSecurityLabel:
+ * @domain: a domain object
+ * @seclabel: pointer to a virSecurityLabel structure
+ *
+ * Extract security label of an active domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2
+ * if the operation is not supported (caller decides if that's
+ * an error).
+ */
+int
+virDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel)
+{
+    virConnectPtr conn;
+
+    if (!VIR_IS_CONNECTED_DOMAIN(domain)) {
+        virLibDomainError(NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, __FUNCTION__);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (seclabel == NULL) {
+        virLibDomainError(domain, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    conn = domain->conn;
+
+    if (conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel)
+        return conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel(domain, seclabel);
+
+    virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__);
+    return -2;
+}
+
+/**
+ * virNodeGetSecurityModel:
+ * @conn: a connection object
+ * @secmodel: pointer to a virSecurityModel structure
+ *
+ * Extract the security model of a hypervisor.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2 if the
+ * operation is not supported (caller decides if that's an error).
+ */
+int
+virNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+{
+    if (!VIR_IS_CONNECT(conn)) {
+        virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_CONN, __FUNCTION__);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (secmodel == NULL) {
+        virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel)
+        return conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel(conn, secmodel);
+
+    virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__);
+    return -2;
+}
 
 /**
  * virDomainAttachDevice:
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms	2009-02-17 10:36:52.867582000 -0500
@@ -334,3 +334,4 @@ virXPathNode;
 virXPathNodeSet;
 virXPathString;
 virXMLPropString;
+virXPathStringLimit;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt	2009-01-20 08:48:28.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms	2009-02-17 10:37:09.630287000 -0500
@@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ LIBVIRT_0.6.0 {
 	virStoragePoolRef;
 	virStorageVolRef;
 	virNodeDeviceRef;
-
+	virDomainGetSecurityLabel;
+	virNodeGetSecurityModel;
 } LIBVIRT_0.5.0;
 
 # .... define new API here using predicted next version number ....
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.339677000 -0500
@@ -1430,6 +1430,8 @@ static virDriver lxcDriver = {
     NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
     NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
     NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+    NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+    NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
     lxcDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
     lxcListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */
     lxcNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am	2009-02-17 10:07:06.346676000 -0500
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ UML_DRIVER_SOURCES =						\
 NETWORK_DRIVER_SOURCES =					\
 		network_driver.h network_driver.c
 
-# And finally storage backend specific impls
+# Storage backend specific impls
 STORAGE_DRIVER_SOURCES =					\
 		storage_driver.h storage_driver.c		\
 		storage_backend.h storage_backend.c
@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES =					\
 STORAGE_HELPER_DISK_SOURCES =					\
 		parthelper.c
 
+# Security framework and drivers for various models
+SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES =					\
+		security.h security.c
+
+SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES =				\
+		security_selinux.h security_selinux.c
 
 NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES =					\
 		node_device.c node_device.h
@@ -377,6 +383,19 @@ libvirt_driver_nodedev_la_LDFLAGS += -mo
 endif
 endif
 
+libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES = $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES)
+if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES
+mod_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la
+else
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la
+endif
+if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES
+libvirt_driver_security_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version
+endif
+
+if HAVE_SELINUX
+libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES += $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES)
+endif
 
 # Add all conditional sources just in case...
 EXTRA_DIST +=							\
@@ -395,7 +414,9 @@ EXTRA_DIST +=							\
 		$(STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES)			\
 		$(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES)			\
 		$(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_HAL_SOURCES)		\
-		$(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES)
+		$(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES)		\
+ 		$(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES)			\
+ 		$(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES)
 
 #
 # Build our version script.  This is composed of three parts:
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.362676000 -0500
@@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static virDriver openvzDriver = {
     NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
     NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
     openvzDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+    NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+    NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
     openvzDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
     openvzListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */
     openvzNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.368680000 -0500
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "domain_conf.h"
 #include "domain_event.h"
 #include "threads.h"
+#include "security.h"
 
 #define qemudDebug(fmt, ...) do {} while(0)
 
@@ -83,6 +84,8 @@ struct qemud_driver {
     virDomainEventQueuePtr domainEventQueue;
     int domainEventTimer;
     int domainEventDispatching;
+
+    virSecurityDriverPtr securityDriver;
 };
 
 /* Status needed to reconenct to running VMs */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.378682000 -0500
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 #include "memory.h"
 #include "uuid.h"
 #include "domain_conf.h"
+#include "security.h"
 
 #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU
 
@@ -383,6 +384,50 @@ next:
     return 0;
 }
 
+static int
+qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
+{
+    int ret;
+    const char *doi, *model;
+    virCapsPtr caps;
+    virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
+
+    ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv);
+    if (ret == -1) {
+        qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to start security driver"));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /* No security driver wanted to be enabled: just return */
+    if (ret == -2)
+        return 0;
+
+    qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv;
+    doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(security_drv);
+    model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(security_drv);
+
+    qemudLog(QEMUD_DEBUG, "Initialized security driver \"%s\" with "
+             "DOI \"%s\".\n", model, doi);
+
+    /*
+     * Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is
+     * initialized.
+     */
+    caps = qemud_drv->caps;
+
+    caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
+    if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
+        qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"), strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
+    if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
+        qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"), strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
 
 /**
  * qemudStartup:
@@ -474,6 +519,11 @@ qemudStartup(void) {
     if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL)
         goto out_of_memory;
 
+    if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0) {
+        qemudShutdown();
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     if (qemudLoadDriverConfig(qemu_driver, driverConf) < 0) {
         goto error;
     }
@@ -1111,6 +1161,15 @@ static int qemudNextFreeVNCPort(struct q
     return -1;
 }
 
+static int qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, struct qemud_driver *driver, virDomainObjPtr vm)
+{
+    if (vm->def->seclabel.label != NULL)
+        if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel)
+            return driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver->securityDriver,
+                                                                  &vm->def->seclabel);
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static virDomainPtr qemudDomainLookupByName(virConnectPtr conn,
                                             const char *name);
 
@@ -1178,6 +1237,16 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnect
         return -1;
     }
 
+    /*
+     * Set up the security label for the domain here, before doing
+     * too much else.
+     */
+    if (qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver, vm) < 0) {
+        qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         _("Failed to set security label"));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
                                 NULL,
                                 &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
@@ -2721,7 +2790,94 @@ cleanup:
     return ret;
 }
 
+static int qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr dom, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel)
+{
+    struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)dom->conn->privateData;
+    virDomainObjPtr vm;
+    const char *type;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    qemuDriverLock(driver);
+    vm = virDomainFindByUUID(&driver->domains, dom->uuid);
+    qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
+
+    if (!vm) {
+        char uuidstr[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN];
+
+        virUUIDFormat(dom->uuid, uuidstr);
+        qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN,
+                         _("no domain with matching uuid '%s'"), uuidstr);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    if (!(type = virDomainVirtTypeToString(vm->def->virtType))) {
+        qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         _("unknown virt type in domain definition '%d'"),
+                         vm->def->virtType);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Theoretically, the pid can be replaced during this operation and
+     * return the label of a different process.  If atomicity is needed,
+     * further validation will be required.
+     *
+     * Comment from Dan Berrange:
+     *
+     *   Well the PID as stored in the virDomainObjPtr can't be changed
+     *   because you've got a locked object.  The OS level PID could have
+     *   exited, though and in extreme circumstances have cycled through all
+     *   PIDs back to ours. We could sanity check that our PID still exists
+     *   after reading the label, by checking that our FD connecting to the
+     *   QEMU monitor hasn't seen SIGHUP/ERR on poll().
+     */
+    if (virDomainIsActive(vm)) {
+        if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel) {
+            if (driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel(dom->conn, vm, seclabel) == -1) {
+                qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                 _("Failed to get security label"));
+                goto cleanup;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    if (vm)
+        virDomainObjUnlock(vm);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+{
+    struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData;
+    char *p;
+
+    if (!driver->securityDriver)
+        return -2;
+
+    p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model;
+    if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) {
+        qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                         VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    strcpy(secmodel->model, p);
+
+    p = driver->caps->host.secModel.doi;
+    if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1) {
+        qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                         VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    strcpy(secmodel->doi, p);
+    return 0;
+}
 
+/* TODO: check seclabel restore */
 static int qemudDomainRestore(virConnectPtr conn,
                               const char *path) {
     struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
@@ -4475,6 +4631,8 @@ static virDriver qemuDriver = {
     NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
 #endif
     qemudDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+    qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+    qemudNodeGetSecurityModel, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
     qemudDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
     qemudListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */
     qemudNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt	2009-02-17 10:07:06.207699000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c	2009-02-17 10:14:28.509959000 -0500
@@ -2299,6 +2299,67 @@ done:
     return rv;
 }
 
+static int
+remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel)
+{
+    remote_domain_get_security_label_args args;
+    remote_domain_get_security_label_ret ret;
+    struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData;
+
+    make_nonnull_domain (&args.dom, domain);
+    memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret);
+    if (call (domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL,
+              (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args, (char *)&args,
+              (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ret.label.label_val != NULL) {
+        if (strlen (ret.label.label_val) >= sizeof seclabel->label) {
+            errorf (domain->conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security label exceeds maximum: %zd"),
+                    sizeof seclabel->label - 1);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        strcpy (seclabel->label, ret.label.label_val);
+        seclabel->enforcing = ret.enforcing;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+remoteNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+{
+    remote_node_get_security_model_ret ret;
+    struct private_data *priv = conn->privateData;
+
+    memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret);
+    if (call (conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL,
+              (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, NULL,
+              (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ret.model.model_val != NULL) {
+        if (strlen (ret.model.model_val) >= sizeof secmodel->model) {
+            errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security model exceeds maximum: %zd"),
+                    sizeof secmodel->model - 1);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        strcpy (secmodel->model, ret.model.model_val);
+    }
+
+    if (ret.doi.doi_val != NULL) {
+        if (strlen (ret.doi.doi_val) >= sizeof secmodel->doi) {
+            errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security doi exceeds maximum: %zd"),
+                    sizeof secmodel->doi - 1);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        strcpy (secmodel->doi, ret.doi.doi_val);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static char *
 remoteDomainDumpXML (virDomainPtr domain, int flags)
 {
@@ -6721,6 +6782,8 @@ static virDriver driver = {
     .domainPinVcpu = remoteDomainPinVcpu,
     .domainGetVcpus = remoteDomainGetVcpus,
     .domainGetMaxVcpus = remoteDomainGetMaxVcpus,
+    .domainGetSecurityLabel = remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel,
+    .nodeGetSecurityModel = remoteNodeGetSecurityModel,
     .domainDumpXML = remoteDomainDumpXML,
     .listDefinedDomains = remoteListDefinedDomains,
     .numOfDefinedDomains = remoteNumOfDefinedDomains,
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c
--- /dev/null	2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.396676000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *     James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ */
+#include <config.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "virterror_internal.h"
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+#include "security_selinux.h"
+#endif
+
+static virSecurityDriverStatus testSecurityDriverProbe(void)
+{
+    return SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE;
+}
+
+virSecurityDriver virTestSecurityDriver = {
+    .name                       = "test",
+    .probe                      = testSecurityDriverProbe,
+};
+
+static virSecurityDriverPtr security_drivers[] = {
+    &virTestSecurityDriver,
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+    &virSELinuxSecurityDriver,
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * Probe each security driver: each should perform a test to see if it
+ * should be loaded, e.g. if the currently active host security mechanism
+ * matches.  If the probe succeeds, initialize the driver and return it.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and -1 on error.  If no security driver wanted to
+ * be enabled, then return -2 and let the caller determine what this really
+ * means.
+ */
+int
+virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(security_drivers) / sizeof(security_drivers[0])); i++) {
+        virSecurityDriverPtr tmp = security_drivers[i];
+        virSecurityDriverStatus ret = tmp->probe();
+
+        switch (ret) {
+        case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE:
+            virSecurityDriverInit(tmp);
+            if (tmp->open(NULL, tmp) == -1) {
+                return -1;
+            } else {
+                *drv = tmp;
+                return 0;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE:
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    return -2;
+}
+
+void
+virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    char errorMessage[1024];
+
+    if (fmt) {
+        va_start(args, fmt);
+        vsnprintf(errorMessage, sizeof(errorMessage) - 1, fmt, args);
+        va_end(args);
+    } else
+        errorMessage[0] = '\0';
+
+    virRaiseError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_FROM_SECURITY, code,
+                  VIR_ERR_ERROR, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, "%s",
+                  errorMessage);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helpers
+ */
+void
+virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+    memset(&drv->_private, 0, sizeof drv->_private);
+}
+
+int
+virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn,
+                        virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                        const char *doi)
+{
+    if (strlen(doi) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN) {
+        virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+                               _("%s: DOI \'%s\' is "
+                               "longer than the maximum allowed length of %d"),
+                               __func__, doi, VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN - 1);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    strcpy(drv->_private.doi, doi);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+const char *
+virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+    return drv->_private.doi;
+}
+
+const char *
+virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+    return drv->name;
+}
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h
--- /dev/null	2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.402676000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *     James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_H__
+#define __VIR_SECURITY_H__
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "domain_conf.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return values for security driver probing: the driver will determine
+ * whether it should be enabled or disabled.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+    SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE      = 0,
+    SECURITY_DRIVER_ERROR       = -1,
+    SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE     = -2,
+} virSecurityDriverStatus;
+
+typedef struct _virSecurityDriver virSecurityDriver;
+typedef virSecurityDriver *virSecurityDriverPtr;
+typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virConnectPtr conn,
+                                      virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDomainGetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
+                                          virDomainObjPtr vm,
+                                          virSecurityLabelPtr sec);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDomainSetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
+                                          virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                                          virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef);
+
+struct _virSecurityDriver {
+    const char *name;
+    virSecurityDriverProbe probe;
+    virSecurityDriverOpen open;
+    virSecurityDomainGetLabel domainGetSecurityLabel;
+    virSecurityDomainSetLabel domainSetSecurityLabel;
+
+    /*
+     * This is internally managed driver state and should only be accessed
+     * via helpers below.
+     */
+    struct {
+        char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];
+    } _private;
+};
+
+/* Global methods */
+int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv);
+
+void
+virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...)
+    ATTRIBUTE_FORMAT(printf, 3, 4);
+
+/* Helpers */
+void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn,
+                            virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                            const char *doi);
+const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+
+#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c
--- /dev/null	2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.407678000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *     James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ * SELinux security driver.
+ */
+#include <config.h>
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "security_selinux.h"
+
+#define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI       "0"
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void)
+{
+    return is_selinux_enabled() ? SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE : SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE;
+}
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+    /*
+     * Where will the DOI come from?  SELinux configuration, or qemu
+     * configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0".
+     */
+    virSecurityDriverSetDOI(conn, drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
+                                      virDomainObjPtr vm,
+                                      virSecurityLabelPtr sec)
+{
+    security_context_t ctx;
+
+    if (getpidcon(vm->pid, &ctx) == -1) {
+        virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling "
+                               "getpidcon(): %s"), __func__,
+                               strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (strlen((char *) ctx) >= VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN) {
+        virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+                               _("%s: security label exceeds "
+                               "maximum length: %d"), __func__,
+                               VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN - 1);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    strcpy(sec->label, (char *) ctx);
+    free(ctx);
+
+    sec->enforcing = security_getenforce();
+    if (sec->enforcing == -1) {
+        virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling "
+                               "security_getenforce(): %s"), __func__,
+                               strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
+                                      virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+                                      const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef)
+{
+    /* TODO: verify DOI */
+
+    if (!STREQ(drv->name, secdef->model)) {
+        virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+                               _("%s: security label driver mismatch: "
+                                 "\'%s\' model configured for domain, but "
+                                 "hypervisor driver is \'%s\'."),
+                                 __func__, secdef->model, drv->name);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (setexeccon(secdef->label) == -1) {
+        virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+                               _("%s: unable to set security context "
+                               "'\%s\': %s."), __func__, secdef->label,
+                               strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver = {
+    .name                       = "selinux",
+    .probe                      = SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe,
+    .open                       = SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen,
+    .domainGetSecurityLabel     = SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel,
+    .domainSetSecurityLabel     = SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel,
+};
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h
--- /dev/null	2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.413677000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *     James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__
+#define __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__
+
+extern virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver;
+
+#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.419677000 -0500
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfoFD(v
     VIR_FREE(target->perms.label);
 
 #if HAVE_SELINUX
+    /* XXX: make this a security driver call */
     if (fgetfilecon(fd, &filecon) == -1) {
         if (errno != ENODATA && errno != ENOTSUP) {
             virReportSystemError(conn, errno,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt	2009-01-20 15:39:28.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.428677000 -0500
@@ -3510,6 +3510,8 @@ static virDriver testDriver = {
     NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
     NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
     NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+    NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+    NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
     testDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
     testListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */
     testNumOfDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.436676000 -0500
@@ -1852,6 +1852,8 @@ static virDriver umlDriver = {
     NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
     NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
     NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+    NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+    NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
     umlDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
     umlListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */
     umlNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.447677000 -0500
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ static const vshCmdOptDef opts_undefine[
     {NULL, 0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
+/* XXX MAC policy for defining & undefining domains ?? */
 static int
 cmdUndefine(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd)
 {
@@ -1515,6 +1516,8 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd
 {
     virDomainInfo info;
     virDomainPtr dom;
+    virSecurityModel secmodel;
+    virSecurityLabel seclabel;
     int ret = TRUE, autostart;
     unsigned int id;
     char *str, uuid[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN];
@@ -1573,6 +1576,29 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd
                  autostart ? _("enable") : _("disable") );
     }
 
+    /* Security model and label information */
+    memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel);
+    if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(ctl->conn, &secmodel) == -1) {
+        virDomainFree(dom);
+        return FALSE;
+    } else {
+        /* Only print something if a security model is active */
+        if (secmodel.model[0] != '\0') {
+            vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security model:"), secmodel.model);
+            vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security DOI:"), secmodel.doi);
+
+            /* Security labels are only valid for active domains */
+            memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel);
+            if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) {
+                virDomainFree(dom);
+                return FALSE;
+            } else {
+                if (seclabel.label[0] != '\0')
+                    vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s (%s)\n", _("Security label:"),
+                             seclabel.label, seclabel.enforcing ? "enforcing" : "permissive");
+            }
+        }
+    }
     virDomainFree(dom);
     return ret;
 }
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.454684000 -0500
@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ static const char *virErrorDomainName(vi
         case VIR_FROM_UML:
             dom = "UML ";
             break;
+        case VIR_FROM_SECURITY:
+            dom = "Security Labeling ";
+            break;
     }
     return(dom);
 }
@@ -962,6 +965,12 @@ virErrorMsg(virErrorNumber error, const 
             else
                     errmsg = _("Node device not found: %s");
             break;
+        case VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL:
+            if (info == NULL)
+		    errmsg = _("Security model not found");
+            else
+		    errmsg = _("Security model not found: %s");
+            break;
     }
     return (errmsg);
 }
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt	2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c	2009-02-17 10:07:06.461676000 -0500
@@ -77,6 +77,39 @@ virXPathString(virConnectPtr conn,
 }
 
 /**
+ * virXPathStringLimit:
+ * @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate
+ * @maxlen: maximum length permittred string
+ * @ctxt: an XPath context
+ *
+ * Wrapper for virXPathString, which validates the length of the returned
+ * string.
+ *
+ * Returns a new string which must be deallocated by the caller or NULL if
+ * the evaluation failed.
+ */
+char *
+virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn,
+                    const char *xpath,
+                    size_t maxlen,
+                    xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt)
+{
+    char *tmp = virXPathString(conn, xpath, ctxt);
+
+    if (tmp != NULL) {
+        if (strlen(tmp) >= maxlen) {
+            virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                         _("\'%s\' value longer than %Zd bytes in virXPathStringLimit()"),
+                        xpath, maxlen);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else
+        virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                    _("\'%s\' missing in virXPathStringLimit()"), xpath);
+    return tmp;
+}
+
+/**
  * virXPathNumber:
  * @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate
  * @ctxt: an XPath context
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt	2008-08-12 03:13:00.000000000 -0400
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h	2009-02-17 10:07:06.467677000 -0500
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ int		virXPathBoolean	(virConnectPtr conn
 char *		virXPathString	(virConnectPtr conn,
                                  const char *xpath,
                                  xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt);
+char *          virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn,
+                                    const char *xpath,
+                                    size_t maxlen,
+                                    xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt);
 int		virXPathNumber	(virConnectPtr conn,
                                  const char *xpath,
                                  xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf
--- libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt	2008-12-22 08:21:49.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf	2009-02-17 10:07:06.470678000 -0500
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ while :; do
       -e '/^libnuma: Warning: .sys not mounted or no numa system/d' \
     err > k && mv k err
 
+  # Filter out this diagnostic, too.
+  sed '/^Initialized security driver/d' err > k && mv k err
+
   printf '%s\n\n' "remoteReadConfigFile: $f: $param_name: $msg" > expected-err
   diff -u expected-err err || fail=1
 

Attachment: libvirt-0.6.0-svirt.patch.sig
Description: Binary data

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