On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 09:02:23 +0800, zhang bo wrote: > On 2015/3/28 0:25, Peter Krempa wrote: > > > On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 10:54:26 +0800, zhang bo wrote: > > > > > Too powerful? That is a ridiculous statement that probably originates > > from some kind of misunderstanding when creating a security policy or > > stuff like that. If a policy bans nc as "powerful" then it's missing on > > a lot of other options how to create listening or outgoing connections > > on arbitrary sockets. The only insecure part is that it does not use > > encryption, but that's a widely known fact about nc. > > > > > Sorry for replying so late:) > I tried to confirm the security fact the other days, unfortunately no clear answer gotten. > What I meant was that the *network monitoring tools*, such as 'nc' and 'tcpdump', > they are considered as dangerous for network security. They are prohibited > in our company and some other organizations. I'm not quite sure whether the result that > they're prohibited are directly related to their capability of monitoring network. > But they actually got prohibited anyway. That sounds like a security-by-obscurity policy. I don't think that banning such tools might have any benefit for security. Anyways I'm planing on adding the native client. In such case, companies having such ridiculous security rules may opt to uninstall netcat and rely solely on libvirt's internal client (once it's implemented). Such policy will then basically mandate a minimal version of libvirt that will support the new client as older clients will still want to use NC. Peter
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