Re: Remote patch, 2007/02/19

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Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Wed, Feb 21, 2007 at 06:13:40PM +0000, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
Daniel P. Berrange wrote:

With that in mind I'd venture to suggest we ditch the whole idea of cookies
completely.

Every method on the server end is already given a
    'struct svc_req *req'

This struct contains a field

    ' SVCXPRT *rq_xprt;'

Which represents the data transport of the client. And the SVCXPRT struct
has as its first member the '  int xp_sock' which is the socket associated
with the client.
So we can trivially & securely map from a client's TCP connetion to the
virConnectPtr without needing any magic cookies.
What concerns me here is that xp_sock is just a file descriptor and fds can be reused. It is also an fd that could be any of:
 * a TCPv6 socket
 * a TCPv4 socket
 * a Unix domain socket
* on the client side, a socketpair (which on Linux is a funny type of Unix domain socket) So finding something unique about it may be tricky. What happens if two clients connect in succession over the local Unix domain socket?

I've just noticed that since we are providing our own server side transport
implementations in sunrpc/svc_{tcp,ext,gnutls}.c we already have a place
where we can safely put in cleanup hooks. In the 'svctcp_destroy' just
after we call 'xprt_unregister' we can call out to purge client state
associated with that FD. This ensures that we cleanup state before any new
connection can re-use the same FD number. So there's actually no need to replace the svc_run() method in this case after all.

I was hoping to avoid this. Note that the contents of the sunrpc/ subdirectory (the client and server transports) are independent of libvirt and I hoped to publish them separately so they could be reused in other places. The other problem is the Unix transport, where we use the transport from glibc directly. Anyway, still thinking about this (the last few days have been a dead loss because of new laptop and wireless problems).

Also worth noting is that cookies may represent other server-side objects, in particular domains and networks. We can have multiple domains per connection. The relationship between networks and connections is complicated (and I don't pretend to understand it at the moment either). I will be thinking about this too ...

For domains & networks I imagine we'd just be passing a UUID / Name /
ID across the wire to identify the object in question, as we do with the
existing libvirt_proxy / qemu daemon ?

I'll take a look at this.

Rich.
--
Emerging Technologies, Red Hat  http://et.redhat.com/~rjones/
64 Baker Street, London, W1U 7DF     Mobile: +44 7866 314 421
 "[Negative numbers] darken the very whole doctrines of the equations
 and make dark of the things which are in their nature excessively
 obvious and simple" (Francis Maseres FRS, mathematician, 1759)

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