Re: Shredding a removable drive (OT)

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Mon, 2019-01-28 at 14:03 +0000, Ian Malone wrote:
> > Another point: several people have mentioned using /dev/urandom. It's
> > important to note that this is a *pseudo-random* generator. It starts
> > from a random seed, but from that generates a completely deterministic
> > pattern. If you have the seed, you have everything. And since the idea
> > here is to overwrite the disk, the first part of which contains
> > "plaintext" that follows a regular layout (partition table etc.) it
> > makes the task of decoding the disk even easier as that's the only part
> > you would actually have to analyse at a physical level.
> > 
> 
> /dev/urandom isn't purely pseudorandom, it does use entropy from the
> pool, it will become pseudorandom when entropy runs out and become
> random again when more entropy arrives.

Good to know.

> Unless you have a hardware
> entropy source I suspect using /dev/random will take a much longer
> time to produce enough data even for a single over-write.

Of course.

> However it's
> worth noting that the over-write process is not simply XOR with the
> written bytes (in which case enough plaintext to work out the sequence
> would definitely let you recover the rest of the data), it's
> attempting to randomise the hysteresis effect on the media, which is
> why multiple writes are good, because though they theoretically just
> increase the number of possible residual states each time you do it
> the residual size of the signal you're over-writing is reduced, and
> attempting to get the sequences applied to a known plaintext will
> become harder.

I assume you mean 'shred' does this. 'dd if=/dev/urandom ...' won't.

> I wouldn't recommend just doing /dev/zero if the CIA,
> or even a moderately funded newspaper might specifically be after your
> data, but it would certainly be enough to stop a casual user plugging
> it in and getting anything back, a few urandom writes is enough to
> stop anyone without serious cryptographic expertise and access to the
> equipment necessary to read the platters directly getting anything off
> the disc.

Indeed.

poc
_______________________________________________
users mailing list -- users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe send an email to users-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html
List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx



[Index of Archives]     [Older Fedora Users]     [Fedora Announce]     [Fedora Package Announce]     [EPEL Announce]     [EPEL Devel]     [Fedora Magazine]     [Fedora Summer Coding]     [Fedora Laptop]     [Fedora Cloud]     [Fedora Advisory Board]     [Fedora Education]     [Fedora Security]     [Fedora Scitech]     [Fedora Robotics]     [Fedora Infrastructure]     [Fedora Websites]     [Anaconda Devel]     [Fedora Devel Java]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Fedora Fonts]     [Fedora Marketing]     [Fedora Management Tools]     [Fedora Mentors]     [Fedora Package Review]     [Fedora R Devel]     [Fedora PHP Devel]     [Kickstart]     [Fedora Music]     [Fedora Packaging]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Fedora Legal]     [Fedora Kernel]     [Fedora OCaml]     [Coolkey]     [Virtualization Tools]     [ET Management Tools]     [Yum Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Gnome Users]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Art]     [Fedora Docs]     [Fedora Sparc]     [Libvirt Users]     [Fedora ARM]

  Powered by Linux