On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 17:17:52 +0100,
"M. Fioretti" <mfioretti@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 09:54:41 AM -0500, Bruno Wolff III wrote:
It makes a difference if you are concerned about attacks by users of
the machine, people who grab the machine while it is powered on
The two cases above are exactly what I had in mind, regardless of how
frequent/realistic they are. My brain just got stuck on them, I guess,
so I started refreshing what I knew on the topic. Any further comment
on those cases is welcome.
It makes sense to use luks encrypted partitions so that the file systems
are not practically accessible once the keys are out of memory. You can
also encrypt sensative files separately so that they aren't accessible
in some cases where local users are able to get access to the files. If
you think an attacker is going to try to read the luks keys from memory
you may want to disable firewire to make it harder. If you are looking
at possible seizure by people who are likely to try to do that with
bad consequences if they do, then you might look at some deadman set ups.
Using those risks losing all of your data when you are not under attack,
so you need to be careful trying to do something like that. People have
also been know to set up physical destruction of disk drives that can
be triggered very quickly. Again there is a balancing act between making
sure the drives are destroyed before they are seized and inadvertantly
destroying them when there isn't a real threat.
Another attack you may need to worry about is the evil maid attack where
the computer is accessed and hardware key loggers and the like are
attached and then put back where it was, in the hope you will enter keys
that will be obtained when the device is accessed again later.
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