> >> yeah... I just can't be bothered to set up BIND. That's what things like > >> Google Public DNS is for. :D > > > > No, the purpose of Google Public DNS is to give Google insight into > > every network query you make. Your filterbubble is heavily influenced by > > your history record in Google's DNS system if you have dodged the other > > ways of tracking. This sort of profiling goes further than syndicate > > cookies and trackers ever could -- and is a brilliant, if somewhat > > seductively evil, idea; so long as it is being used on someone other > > than me. > > > > http://dontbubble.us/ > > > > Avoiding Google entirely has brought a great deal of standardization and > > rationality back to my organization -- that we didn't realize was > > beginning to get shaky until just recently. Such an insidious thing, > > filtered and tracked search. > > Do you have any proof that Google's using queries to its Public DNS > service to profile anyone (in spite of its FAQ clarifying that it > isn't)? Requests for proof on the internet from a person who does not work for Google -- an internet argument deconstructionist in his opening play. Nice. (Reminds me demands issued in Usenet of the Apollo landings...) The filter bubble issue is very real. If you and I do a search on Google for any given string, logged in to a Google account of any sort or not, we will receive different results. This is a fact. DNS query history would be the single most potent addition to Google's profiling tags (as in naked profiling, on subjects who are not logged in to a Google service or accepting tracking cookies or other devices). To think that Google would *not* use their DNS query data is absurd. Let us remember that this company has already found no problem in blowing off German court subpoenas to account for and explain their violations of European privacy laws while collecting Wifi and associated personal network data while collecting local map data. Fibbing about their privacy standards, which is nothing new for them anyway, is a minor social foul by comparison. >From a technical perspective whether Google is actually using the data actively right now to profile you or not is unprovable. That does not mean it is not a major security risk now, and increasingly in the future. Conversely, do you have a way of proving that they are not using such data in such a way other than what they say? The evidence of result filtering is highly evident. Are you going to simply trust their story on it? Security and power is all about capability, not intent. Intent can change with the wind (and always eventually does). Consciously seeking the creation of a position of leveragable power is never done for the "common good" there being no such thing anyway. It does not matter if the intent is to use DNS query histories right now or to use them in the future -- the position is being formed for a very deliberate reason. And even if not for a deliberate reason, if Google realizes later on down the road the position they are in the game will suddenly change because capacbility will force a shift in intent. This is strictly in line with everything history has ever demonstrated. There is simply no such thing as a free lunch and Google stands to gain enormously over the long term by marking DNS query records, and ultimately (if possible) by exerting de facto control over the DNS root. Handing Google your DNS root is even less democratic a way of running things than continuing along with the IANA circus -- at least there is more than one entity with a stake to argue there (hence at least some argument), with Google controlling your DNS queries you have eliminated the chance that someone could be at odds with an abusive interest present in the system. If this needs further explaining to anyone on this list then no degree of explaination will ever suffice. -Iwao -- users mailing list users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe or change subscription options: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/users Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
