On Thu, 2009-09-03 at 13:13 +0930, Tim wrote: > Patrick O'Callaghan: > > You're talking about the CPE (Customer Premises Equipment). The CPE is > > not the phone system, which is choc-a-bloc with highly proprietary > > systems, both hardware and software. Nobody cares unless it breaks down. > > (Please don't take this as an argument against open source). > > And which part of a phone system would a user be wanting to run > customised on their own premises? The phone, not the exchange. People > run skype, and its ilk, to have an alternative phone in their hot little > hands. Make the equation phone==PC, Skype infrastructure==phone system. The doubts about Skype security are not focussed on what's running in your PC but on what Skype might be doing in their cloud. You can hack your phone because it has no security at all, but you have no idea what's going on the phone system except that you know for a fact that government agencies (and possibly others) can tap into it. You can't hack Skype (easily) because it's a proprietary black box, and you also have no idea what's going on in the Skype cloud, but there are some unconfirmed rumours that some people might be able to tap into it. The point of my original post was that people complaining about Skype security should consider whether the normal phone system is secure. Obviously, comparing either of them with a well-designed, open source, end-to-end secure system is a different kettle of fish. SIP *may* be the basis of such a system, but it's worth noting that many implementations, including Ekiga, offer *no encryption at all*. poc -- fedora-list mailing list fedora-list@xxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe: https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-list Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Communicate/MailingListGuidelines
