On 6 September 2013 07:43, Matthew Miller <mattdm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 02:19:16PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:I don't think that buys a whole lot, since dictionary-based attacks do the
> > passwords are used. Maybe we could have a policy which requires _longer_
> > passwords but uses a much smaller dictionary?
> Or by default require that every password have at least one non-alphanumeric
> character in it, at which point it'll never match a regular dictionary
> entry ?
simple transforms and character additions people usually do to get around
such checks.
$ echo password1 | /usr/sbin/cracklib-check
password1: it is based on a dictionary word
("password" remains the most popular password of all, but "password1" is
right up there.)
This is why I suggest length. NIST password guidelines
(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63-1/SP-800-63-1.pdf, go to
page 107) suggest that a 16-character (probably all lowercase) password with
no checks is as strong as a 8-character password with dictionary check plus
character set rules.
I am all for 16+ character passwords, but what you get is qazwsxedcrfvtgb versus injureCarpRoast. And then you get a TON of backlash on how hard it is to create a 16 character password that they can remember. Doing our weaker Fedora password rules of 9->12] was enough for me to realize that the amount of pushback one gets from even 'security minded' people. My first question would be is the 8MB worth the pain of that OR would a better solution for ultra-small installations is a kickstart %post scriptlet which does the config that is needed to not have a cracklib installed (because any ultrasmall installation is going to need a lot of scriptlets).
Stephen J Smoogen.
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