On 2006-01-24 08:46:24 +1000, Michael Mansour wrote: > > More generally, I read advice somewhere that mounting /tmp with the > > "noexec" option (and making any other temp directories symbolic > > links to that one) can make this type of attack much more difficult. This doesn't really prevent execution of programs on /tmp, it just makes it more difficult. It is useful against worms which don't expect /tmp to be mounted noexec, though. (In other words: It works as long as only a few people use this trick) > Definately noted as one of the measures to stop this type of attack, but for > this particular server, /tmp is not a mounted filesystem but part of /, so I > can't really do that without re-partitioning the disk and creating a dedicated > /tmp. You could put /tmp on a tmpfs: /etc/fstab: none /tmp tmpfs noexec 0 0 hp -- _ | Peter J. Holzer | If I wanted to be "academically correct", |_|_) | Sysadmin WSR | I'd be programming in Java. | | | hjp@xxxxxxxxx | I don't, and I'm not. __/ | http://www.hjp.at/ | -- Jesse Erlbaum on dbi-users
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