From: "CKI@GitLab" <cki-project@xxxxxxxxxx>
Hi,
As part of the ongoing rebase effort, the following configuration
options need to be reviewed.
As a reminder, the ARK configuration flow involves moving unreviewed
configuration options from the pending directory to the ark directory.
In the diff below, options are removed from the pending directory and
added to the ark hierarchy. The final options that need to be ACKed
are the files that are being added to the ark hierarchy.
If the value for a file that is added should be changed, please reply
with a better option.
CONFIG_ARM64_BTI:
Branch Target Identification (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions)
provides a mechanism to limit the set of locations to which computed
branch instructions such as BR or BLR can jump.
To make use of BTI on CPUs that support it, say Y.
BTI is intended to provide complementary protection to other control
flow integrity protection mechanisms, such as the Pointer
authentication mechanism provided as part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions.
For this reason, it does not make sense to enable this option without
also enabling support for pointer authentication. Thus, when
enabling this option you should also select ARM64_PTR_AUTH=y.
Userspace binaries must also be specifically compiled to make use of
this mechanism. If you say N here or the hardware does not support
BTI, such binaries can still run, but you get no additional
enforcement of branch destinations.
Symbol: ARM64_BTI [=y]
Type : bool
Defined at arch/arm64/Kconfig:1594
Prompt: Branch Target Identification support
Location:
-> Kernel Features
-> ARMv8.5 architectural features
---
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: CKI@GitLab <cki-project@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
.../configs/common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI | 1 +
.../pending-common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI | 31 -------------------
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 31 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 redhat/configs/common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI
delete mode 100644 redhat/configs/pending-common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI
diff --git a/redhat/configs/common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI b/redhat/configs/common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fb0274de0d49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/redhat/configs/common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+CONFIG_ARM64_BTI=y
diff --git a/redhat/configs/pending-common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI b/redhat/configs/pending-common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI
deleted file mode 100644
index 5af4d535b648..000000000000
--- a/redhat/configs/pending-common/generic/CONFIG_ARM64_BTI
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# CONFIG_ARM64_BTI:
-#
-# Branch Target Identification (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions)
-# provides a mechanism to limit the set of locations to which computed
-# branch instructions such as BR or BLR can jump.
-#
-# To make use of BTI on CPUs that support it, say Y.
-#
-# BTI is intended to provide complementary protection to other control
-# flow integrity protection mechanisms, such as the Pointer
-# authentication mechanism provided as part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions.
-# For this reason, it does not make sense to enable this option without
-# also enabling support for pointer authentication. Thus, when
-# enabling this option you should also select ARM64_PTR_AUTH=y.
-#
-# Userspace binaries must also be specifically compiled to make use of
-# this mechanism. If you say N here or the hardware does not support
-# BTI, such binaries can still run, but you get no additional
-# enforcement of branch destinations.
-#
-# Symbol: ARM64_BTI [=y]
-# Type : bool
-# Defined at arch/arm64/Kconfig:1594
-# Prompt: Branch Target Identification support
-# Location:
-# -> Kernel Features
-# -> ARMv8.5 architectural features
-#
-#
-#
-CONFIG_ARM64_BTI=y
--
2.26.2
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