Re: otp resets

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On Thu, Apr 08, 2021 at 12:41:43PM -0700, Kevin Fenzi wrote:
> so tons of people are playing around with them. A number of folks are
> not able to properly save their token, or run into problems adding it
> and need to have that token removed so they can try again. Many of these
> are new users that don't have a gpg key set in their account. We have
> been getting a lot of these of late. ;( 

Or some of them are, like, project leaders who also make mistakes. :)

> * Could we require someone enter their password + token before accepting
> the token? ie, they try and enroll, ipa adds it, they have to verify, if
> they can't, it's removed?

This is _very_ common in other implementations.

> * Could we add 'recovery codes' so if someone enrolls and it's
> wrong/broken, they could use a code to login and add a new token and
> remove the old broken one?

Likewise!

> * Could we perhaps make a 'dev' noggin that people could test with and
> wipe all accounts from every day or something? Then ask people to test
> there if they are unsure how to add otp

We probably _should_ have this for other reasons, but I don't think it's a
good solution to this problem. It adds complexity while still not
guaranteeing that what's done on the production instance will work.

> * Could we 'hide' the otp setup until you have X groups or something?

While this might help some people... .......  ..... .

> 2. How can we verify identity on people who request the removal of their
> last otp? Do we just tell them to make a new account?
> 
> Random ideas:
> 
> * If they are not in any groups, how about we just reset based on email?
> * Or perhaps if they are not in any sysadmin* groups?

I think packager groups should also not be reset just based on email. 

> * If they are Red Hat employees we can use the internal verify thing

Yes. Is there a way we could extend something similar to non-RHers?

> * We could use gpg signed email if there is a gpg key assigned to the
> account. 
> * Could we use ssh key to verify them? 

That at least increases the barrier to impersonation.


-- 
Matthew Miller
<mattdm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Fedora Project Leader
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