On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 04:35:00PM -0400, seth vidal wrote: > > "When changing directories, tmpwatch is very sensitive to possible race > conditions and will exit with an error if one is detected. It does not > follow symbolic links in the directories it's cleaning (even if a symâ > bolic link is given as its argument), will not switch filesystems, > skips lost+found directories owned by the root user, and only removes > empty directories, regular files, and symbolic links." Not sure if this is a documentation or code bug, but this doesn't seem true on the two RHEL5/6 systems I just tested.. > > > It guards against symlink attack by anyone who can run something as > > > user "puppet" and replace /var/lib/puppet/reports/ with a symlink to > > > somewhere else (/). > > so in answer to this - no in fact, tmpwatch can't be exploited that way. > $ rpm -q tmpwatch tmpwatch-2.9.16-3.el6.x86_64 $ ln -s /etc/ /var/tmp/test $ /usr/sbin/tmpwatch --mtime 720 --test /var/tmp/test/ removing file /etc/csh.login removing file /etc/gimp/2.0/unitrc removing file /etc/gimp/2.0/sessionrc removing file /etc/gimp/2.0/controllerrc removing file /etc/gimp/2.0/menurc removing file /etc/gimp/2.0/gimprc removing file /etc/gimp/2.0/gtkrc <snip> -jf _______________________________________________ infrastructure mailing list infrastructure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/infrastructure
