Re: Fixing CSRF exploits in Infrastructure

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On Tue November 25 2008, Toshio Kuratomi wrote:
> Till Maas wrote:

> > It is recommended to not use GET requests to change state on the server,
> > therefore it would be probably better to change these GET requests to
> > POST requests.
>
> The proposal doesn't specifically mention POST there as well but it
> should to make things clearer:
>
> "Every time we submit a form or make a GET request that can change state
> on the server"
>
> s/submit/POST/
> /me changes that now.
>
> The reasons the proposal is explicit about GET are:
>
> 1) We'd have to constantly audit code for places where GET is being used
> to alter state and change that.  This is doable if the app authors are
> aware of this but not so scalable if it's me going through and making
> those changes.

Now I am confused. Do you want to require the token for every request of an 
authenticated user then, regardless of whether or not they can change state 
on the server?

Regards,
Till

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