On Sat, 2008-08-30 at 23:53 -0400, Warren Togami wrote: > Axel Thimm wrote: > > > > Either the key is considered compromized and one needs to do the full > > program, or it is reasonably considered safe (by a brute-force safe > > passphrase and really assuming the passphrase has not been lost to the > > intruder as well), in which case no steps are needed, but phasing it > > out before the computing power gets accessible to break it (e.g. new > > keys for F10 upwards). > > > > The current program looks like a mix of assuming "safe" (so the old > > key can be used for signing new packages, even if it just a few) and > > assuming "compromised" needing a resiging of all content. > > It turns out that we're ahead of schedule in re-signing. Due to bodhi > limitations we needed to resign all updates before pushing any new > updates, and that is done now. I have to check with Jesse but I suspect > resigning of Everything should be done early during this upcoming week. > (It might even be close to done now, I dunno.) > > http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/rel-eng/2008-August/001627.html > The re-signing of Everything however is not blocking implementation of > the first stages of the plan - which includes updates going out. > > Anyhow, updates should begin flowing soon, and shortly thereafter the > old key is removed. Oh, did you actually test rpm -e during %post? > According to skvidal it doesn't work because it locks the transaction. > Jeremy thinks the only assured way we can remove the old key is with a > hardcoded hack in rpm that will be removed in F10 rpm. > I tested rpm -e during %post on two f9 systems, It locked the rpmdb hard. -sv _______________________________________________ Fedora-infrastructure-list mailing list Fedora-infrastructure-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-infrastructure-list
